

General Von Sneak

by
Robert Blatchford

A study of the great war by a peace-loving soul who personally detests war. It is a bold and fearless indictment of Prussianism and a vigorous plea for the whole-hearted endeavour of the nation for the prosecution of the War.

"It stands to the eternal credit of Robert Blatchford that not only during the war but long before, he saw with knight-errant forthrightness and intellectual courage that the threat to civilisation lay in the calculated bestiality and brutishness of a German war-machine that nothing could break but utter defeat and crushing."

HALDANE MACFALL, Author of "Germany at Bay"

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A LITTLE STUDY OF THE WAR

BY

ROBERT BLATCHFORD

Fourth Impression

HODDER AND STOUGHTON

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To
MY SON, PRIVATE CORRI BLATCHFORD,
XITH BATTALION THE QUEEN'S ROYAL WEST SURREY
REGIMENT,
Who has had to do my "Bit" as well as his own.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

This book is meant to be an easy guide to the study of the great War.

My aim is to show the causes and the purposes of the War; and the dangers of a weak peace.

I shall show that the real cause of the War is the German lust for world conquest, and that the only way to make a safe peace is to overthrow the enemy by force of arms, and to deny them the means of making war again.

We cannot stop Germany from making war again if we leave to her the means to prepare for war.

We cannot stop her from preparing for war until we break her power in the field.

There is no such thing to be had as a cheap, easy or bloodless peace. Germany will not let us have a cheap or easy peace. She will go on fighting until she is beaten, unless——

Unless she can trap us into a false and dangerous truce.

This war *must* be fought to the bitter end—*now or hereafter*.

I shall say nothing about the acts or aims of Germany, nor about the dangers of a false or weak peace which cannot be backed up by sound evidence. But since in a

small book I cannot give all the evidence, I shall give the names and prices of other books, in which those still in doubt may study the case more deeply.

Thus this book, besides being a guide to the War, and to the dangers of a weak peace, will, in some sort, be a guide to other books in which those matters are more fully treated.

Every sane Briton *knows* that neither our Government nor our people wanted war. The files of our newspapers before the War prove that.

No one in this country wanted war, and although there were some of us who feared that Germany meant to make war, so unwarlike was the public mind that most of our people of all classes refused to listen to any warning.

Even when the storm broke, even now while it is still raging there are many who have not read the mind of Germany or gauged her purpose, who are not yet alive to the greatness of the danger, who cling to the belief that soft words will turn away the murderous wrath of savage enemies and that the long-prepared and merciless assault on Europe may be stayed without further bloodshed, if only we will stop and parley with our cunning and ruthless enemy in the gate.

It is for these, and for all other doubting, shrinking and mistaken believers in meekness and goodwill that I write this book.

“The tender mercies of the wicked are cruel.”

FOREWORD

THE most valuable asset in British journalism during the present generation—if by a generation we count five-and-twenty years—has been ROBERT BLATCHFORD. When one has not seen eye to eye with Blatchford, one has always carefully weighed one's own position, lest one should have gone wrong in some detail; for, and this is one of the highest tributes that can be paid to any man who informs public opinion, Blatchford never writes a word about a thing unless he thoroughly understands it. I admit that it is a most unjournalistic quality—it is the journalist's job to "make a story" at any price; but Blatchford is of the stern stuff that cannot be bought. If he does not know, he listens. He is in fact very English. When he knows, and he sees the people blundering, he gives tongue reckless of self or all advantage. He is incapable of a dishonesty, intellectual or moral. The consequence is that Blatchford is as thoroughly trusted by the people as he is unrecognised by the authorities—yet if there be one man who deserves recognition about the war it is Robert Blatchford. Had Blatchford been made the guide of the nation's propaganda from the beginning of the war, the utter darkness concerning the war throughout the masses, in the trenches and out of the trenches, would not to-day be weighing as its most dangerous burden upon the shoulders of the government. Had the Press and the Public been given a clear and steady light upon the significance of the

war such as Blatchford, here holds up to them, instead of the vague and muddled thinking that is rife, the government, could they but have foreseen it, would not have had the perplexities and dangers to overcome which are now manifesting themselves in the interference by sections of the workers at home in the prosecution of the war to a victorious end. It is all very well to abuse the pacifists and the labour conferences; but the pacifists would have been few, and the labour conferences would have voted right; IF THEY HAD ONLY KNOWN WHAT THE WAR WAS ABOUT. And it stands to Robert Blatchford's eternal credit that not only during the war, but long before the war, whether it meant a breach with his old party allies or having to speak from the rostrum of his political enemies, he shrank from no personal loss so long as he could give voice to that large and strategic vision of the impending calamity the chief danger of which lay in the hopeless unstrategic thinking of the British peoples—above all those in high places. Robert Blatchford has been right from the very beginning. He has never gone wrong. And if any word of mine carry weight with the public, I would urge every man and every woman to possess and read and consider every word in this small volume. It gives in a brief and handy form a clear idea of that larger and vitally national work which, through good and evil days, Blatchford has done for humanity. If there be one man who ought to be honoured for his dogged fight for the freedom of the world and the right of every man and woman to live life, that man is the author of this little book. It is a tragic part of his splendid and broad humanity that this fervent

lover of freedom and peace should have had to stand for war, however righteous that war; but Robert Blatchford saw with knight-errant forthrightness and intellectual courage that the threat to civilization lay in the calculated bestiality and brutishness of a German war-machine that nothing could break but utter defeat and crushing. And sadly as he had to bow to the revelation, from the moment his innately strategic vision looked upon it and saw its cruel and overwhelming purpose, he did not shrink from the horror of it, nor shut his eyes to it, but like the lion that he is, he addressed himself straightway to its utter annihilation as the only means by which to rid it for ever from this much troubled earth so that the world might be a fair place in which to dwell, and man its noblest habitant.

There is no living writer who more thoroughly understands the British peoples than Robert Blatchford—no man more generous and kindly to our mundane weaknesses nor whose pen flicks our failings with more tender raillery—no man who glories in our spiritual greatness with hotter enthusiasm. And it is perhaps the saddest part of the task that has fallen to his lot that he who passionately detests war and loves the ways of peace, he who was born to be a tuneful guide to sing us back to Merry England, should have had to devote his vigorous gifts, compelled thereto by righteous indignation, to preaching the greatest of all the Crusades for the prosecution of a war if need be to the uttermost bitter sacrifices so long as that complete victory be won whereby alone the world can be saved.

HALDANE MACFALL.



CHAPTER I

WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING FOR

TO understand the war we must know what the quarrel is about: we must know what both sides are fighting for.

To know that we must understand the *Strategy* of the war.

Let us not funk the word strategy. It is an ugly word, and has kept bad company, but it will not harm us.

Strategy is as easy to understand as cricket.

We all know what is meant by the word stratagem. Well, strategy is the stratagems of war. It is war craft.

Strategy and tactics make up the art of war.

Tactics is the art of handling troops or ships in battle. It does not concern us here.

Strategy is the management of a campaign or a war. It lays plans and uses means for war. That is why places, or "positions," which can be used in war, are called "strategic points."

To understand a war we must understand the strategic aims, the strategic plans and the strategic means.

The strategic (or military) aims are the objects for which the war is fought.

The strategic (or military) plans are the plans for attack and defence.

The strategic (or military) means are the means used in attack or defence.

Fleets, armies, railways, rivers, hills, bridges, forests, coaling stations and naval bases are "strategic means."

Having seen what strategy is, let us see what is the strategy of Germany in this war.

When we know what Germany wants (strategic aim), how she acts to get it (strategic plan), and what she uses or tries to use, to gain her ends (strategic means), and what the Allies stand to gain or lose by the war (strategic results), we shall understand this war, and shall be able to form a good idea as to who caused it.

It is quite easy to understand all these things if we see about it in the right way.

What a lot of ink and breath has been spent over "our war aims," and what a pickle our clever men have got themselves and us into over those "aims." Yet it is a simple matter.

What are we fighting for?

We are fighting to defeat the Germans.

We are fighting to prevent them from taking something that is ours.

Germany wants to take from us our trade, our colonies, our reputation (prestige), and our liberty.

We do not want to take anything from Germany *except the power and the means to do us harm.*

Now, if Germany wants to rob us, and if we only want to prevent her from robbing us, which side is likely to have wanted and caused the war?

What is Germany's war aim? It is the conquest of the earth.

Her object is to conquer, plunder, enslave and humiliate Europe, Asia, Africa, America and Australasia. It is not I who say this: it is the Germans who say it.

Such an ambition sounds like the dream of a madman.

It is not a dream—it is a *plan*.

Let us see how Germany hopes to carry out this plan; then we shall understand the war.

When I speak of Germany here I mean Germany and her Allies: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria: four warlike nations with one hundred and forty-two millions of people.

What was Germany's strategic (military) aim in this war?

Germany's *chief* aim in this war was not to crush France or Russia. She made war on France and Russia to disable them, so that they could not foil her *chief* aim.

Her chief aim was to seize and hold strategic means for her future steps in her conquest of the world.

Her first move was the crushing of Serbia. As she knew that Russia would not allow that, and that France would stand by Russia, she made war on France and Russia first, and left Austria to deal with Serbia.

If France and Russia had let Austria crush Serbia there would have been no great European war—not for a time.

Never lose sight of Serbia. Serbia is the key to the whole problem.

Just before war was declared I saw in London a news-

paper placard: "To Hell with Serbia." That was written by someone who did not understand the "strategic situation," who did not understand the strategic (war) aims of Germany, who did not know what the war was about.

When we hear anyone talking about peace terms and war aims without even naming Serbia we may be quite sure that person does not understand the war.

Serbia is the bone of contention. The war is about Serbia.

The danger of a weak peace is the danger of forgetting Serbia.

Why is Serbia the key to the problem?

Because Germany's chief strategic aim was and *is* to seize and hold "Middle Europe" and to command the road from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.

Germany would make peace at once if she could hold middle Europe and the road to the Persian Gulf.

It would pay Germany to quit France and Belgium and to hand over Alsace and Lorraine if she could hold what she has taken in "Middle Europe," Serbia, and the road from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. That is what she fought for, though she was willing to take anything else she could get. Leave Germany as she is in middle Europe, and she has won her war. *And we have lost the next war.* Which will come soon.

Germany wanted the free run of the Bagdad railway, a clear passage from Germany to Bagdad.

Serbia barred the way.

Turkey and Bulgaria were Germany's tools and lackeys.

All the road was open except at the point where Serbian and Rumanian land meet and cut off Austria-Hungary from Bulgaria.

Germany's great high road to the conquest of the world was stopped by the small tongue of Serbian soil called, strangely enough, "the Iron Gate."

To break that iron gate Germany risked a war with France and Russia. She holds the gate and her road is open for the conquest of the world.

The shortest cut across Serbian soil is a little over thirty miles. Germany risked a world war, risked all she had, to win that way.

If she risked so much to win it, and has won it, is she likely to give it up while she can hold it, at any cost?

Now, there can be no real and lasting peace until she does give it up. Either at the Serbian gate, or at Constantinople, Germany must be stopped from reaching Asia Minor overland.

The very best means of stopping the German road to the Persian Gulf was that chosen by the Allies: the handing over of Constantinople to Russia.

Why was that the best plan? A strategist will tell us that there is not much use in taking a strategic point unless we can hold it.

It would do France no good to get back Alsace if she had to lose it shortly after in another German war.

It would be no use closing the Serbian gate if Germany still had power to break it open.

If the Balkan States were united and solid, with Russia to back them, the Serbian gate might hold. But between

Bulgaria and Serbia there is bitter hatred, and the Bulgarians are as treacherous as the Germans.

But if Russia were restored to reason and had a firm Government and a sane policy, then to drive the Turks out of Europe and give the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles into the Russian care would mean that Germany has lost the war and that a solid peace is possible.

There are many Britons of "To Hell with Serbia" mind who will wonder what the Bosphorus and the Iron Gate and the Persian Gulf matter to us.

Anything that matters so much to Germany matters to us. If an enemy will risk a world war to win a railway that railway must mean more to us than any line in the United Kingdom.

One of the uses of strategy is to teach us that a small point may be of great value, and that a distant point may be the key to our main position.

Heligoland and Gibraltar are small places. The Suez Canal is a long way off; yet all three are vital spots. The Germans know this. They do not ask "What is Suez or what is Basra or what is Calais to us?" They have fought half Europe for thirty-three miles of railway track, in a barren rocky range, in a minor state. Had a German paper said "To Hell with Serbia!" all Germany would have roared in chorus: "Hoch, hoch, hoch!"

One of Germany's aims is to drive the British out of Egypt, and capture the Suez Canal. Writing in 1915, Herr Ernst Jackh said:—

"Suez is the only direct connection of European

England and the African, Asiatic and Australian portions of the Empire. *Here the vital nerve can be struck at.* At Suez we can stab England through the heart and kill her."

Let us look at the map. The Bagdad railway crosses the Bosphorus at Constantinople and goes on through Turkish land. Turkey is the ally and servant of Germany, and she owns Basra, which is at the head of the Persian Gulf. Let us speak first of the Gulf as a German naval base.

Basra would be in direct railway connection with Hamburg, Vienna and Berlin. It would be on Turkish soil at the head of what is almost a closed sea. With Cape Dibbah, at the mouth of the Gulf, fortified, the Persian Gulf would be impregnable. As strong a fortress as the Dardanelles.

Looking at the map again, we shall find that Aleppo (Turkish) is 200 miles overland from Port Said and the Suez Canal, and that Dibbah on the Gulf is 600 miles from Karachi and 1,000 miles from Bombay by sea.

Turkey has a population of twenty-two millions. Under German rule Turkey could raise an army of a million men.

That army could be joined by Austrian and German armies of great strength, which could be moved overland.

Now from Berlin to Aleppo is about 2,500 miles by rail, while from London to Port Said is 3,213 miles by sea.

From Cape Dibbah on the Gulf to Bombay is 1,000 miles, and from London to Bombay is 6,187 miles.

With a Turkish army round Bagdad and Aleppo, with

a German and Austrian army on the Bagdad railway, and with a German fleet and a German naval base close to the Indian coast, what kind of a strategic fix should we be in when the Germans and the Turks invaded Egypt or India?

Could we hold the Suez Canal against such odds?

If we lost the Canal all our troops and all our trade must go to India and Australia, to China and Japan, around the Cape.

Basra is a small place and a long way off. But Germany knows what Basra means, and it will pay us to remember.

There is another point to bear in mind. With the road open from Hamburg to Bagdad, Germany could make a naval base at Smyrna.

Let us bethink ourselves once more that Germany holds the road from Hamburg to Bagdad, and that Russia though not defeated, is brought to a state of poverty and confusion and may even cease to count as a great power. Let us remember that Serbia is crushed, that the Balkan nations are divided and that Turkey and Bulgaria are under Germany's whip and goad, and then we shall be able to understand why Germany wants peace.

She wants peace because if we leave off fighting now she will have won the war. She will have taken and held the strategic means to world conquest for which she fought.

All the nations are impoverished and war-weary. Would the French or British people be willing to go to war again in five years or ten to stop Germany from

making a naval base on the Persian Gulf, or to stop her from building the Bagdad railway right up to our Indian border?

No. If we make peace before Germany is quite beaten we have lost the war and all our men have died in vain.

In the past Germany has not been able to strike at England or at any part of the British Empire, because we were her masters on the seas.

But if we leave her an open road from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf she will be able to strike at us overland.

We used to groan under what we called "the burden of armaments." What would the burden of our armaments be if we had to defend Egypt and India against armies of Germans, Austrians and Turks, massed in Palestine and Persia?

True, we have taken Bagdad, and there is talk of giving Palestine to the Jews. But a strategist will ask us: "How will you hold Bagdad? And what will happen to the Jews in Palestine, if Germany joins the Turks in Asia Minor?"

A strategist is one who sees *facts*, and reasons from facts. With the Bagdad railway working, with Germany, Austria and Turkey in alliance, and with German naval bases in the Persian Gulf and at Smyrna, our strategic position in India and Egypt would be almost hopeless.

But British luck or pluck might pull us through. Perhaps. But we do not want another war. Now a strategist will tell us that with such a great chance of victory as the holding of Turkey and the Bagdad railway

would give them, Germany and her Allies would be sure to make another war.

So that a peace which left Germany the open road from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf would not be a real peace, but only a dangerous truce.

But it may be asked what do these things matter to America, to France, to Italy, to China, to Japan? Is it not the British Empire only that is threatened?

And the answer is that the defeat of Britain and the fall of the British Empire would make it impossible for France or Italy or China or Japan to hold out against Germany, and would expose America to a long war, and perhaps defeat.

Another thing. If we go back to our pre-war system of trade and commerce, our commercial position will be as strategically false and dangerous as our strategic position in India and Egypt.

Germany makes war in peace time. Her war machine is a peace machine. And her peace machine *never makes peace.*

But with this we will deal in another chapter.

CHAPTER II

WHAT GERMANY IS AND WHAT SHE BELIEVES

TO understand Germany and to understand the war we must never think of Germany or Germans as being like England and Englishmen.

We must never think of Germans except as part of Germany.

We must never think of Germany except as an organised and purposeful instrument of the Kaiser and the General Staff.

It is her organisation, her discipline, and her purpose which make Germany unlike every other nation.

It is because she is a national organisation working obediently to a single will, and always towards a settled purpose, that she is formidable.

It is because she is a national organisation working under a single will towards a settled purpose of a violent and evil kind that she is dangerous.

The German menace, the German danger, the German horror, and the German crime are—Germany.

If we think of Germany always as a disciplined army with a single purpose, ruled by a single will, fired by an insatiate lust of money and power and vainglory, and

destitute of any respect for law or justice or compassion, we shall be in fit mood to understand the war.

If we think of Germany as a nation of men and women like the British, the French, or the Americans; think of her as a race of sane and decent persons driven against their will by a despot into war and crime, we shall never understand Germany or the war.

There is no democracy in Germany. There is no real public opinion in Germany—except that served out by the minions of the Kaiser and the Junkers and the General Staff.

The German Parliament and the German voter have no say in the Army or in anything that goes to arm or mould or direct or employ the Army. The Kaiser is an autocrat.

To grasp that, imagine King George as Emperor and All Highest, as Prime Minister, Minister of War and Marine, Foreign Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Press Censor, Director of Education, and head of the shipping, banking, trade, and commerce, with millions invested in commerce and finance.

Imagine our Parliament with no real control over expenditure, nor over the Army or Navy, nor over education or religion, with no real power to make or alter laws, with no voice in foreign affairs.

Imagine this country in the grip of militarism, with brutal officers insulting civilians, and stabbing them if they protest.

Imagine this country with a belief that Might is Right, and that necessity knows no law.

Imagine this country with a programme including the seizure of the French coal mines and the Belgian coal and iron districts, and the French and Belgian Channel ports, the invasion of America, the conquest of Germany, the seizure of Heligoland, and the Dutch and Belgian colonies.

We cannot imagine these things. But in Germany they are all recognised and established.

In Germany in the nineties a man wrote a book claiming that Germans are "supermen," that they did all that was worth doing in the past, and are destined by God to seize and rule all that is worth having in the future. This insane book so pleased the Kaiser that "he ordered it to be made the standard work of national opinion in all universities, schools, and centres of education, himself paying for 80,000 copies."

Now suppose that, at the time when English opinion was railing at some of us for talking about the German menace, King Edward VII had "ordered" all our universities and schools to use a mad, lying Jingo book as the standard of "public opinion," what would the British Press and Parliament and public opinion have said?

But the Kaiser did it, and until we understand that such things can be done and are done in Germany we cannot grasp the meaning of the German peril.

When we speak of Germany in relation to this war we mean Germany and her Allies. What, in this sense, is Germany?

She is Prussia and the rest of Germany.

She is Austria and Hungary.

She is Turkey.

She is Bulgaria.

She is millions of Germans living in enemy and neutral countries.

She is the Empress of Russia and the King and Queen of Greece.

She is a population of 142 millions.

But if we only think of Germany as 142 millions of human beings we shall be wrong. The centre of that system is the German war and peace machine: Germany proper.

Germany herself is one great war machine. She is a national army commanded by the Kaiser and his General Staff. We are often told that the German Army is the German people. But we must remember that the German people are the German Army.

Germany is the only nation in the world that is nationally organised.

She is the only nation in the world that is nationally disciplined. Hers is the only regimented people.

Germany alone has mobilised and disciplined every class and every interest.

She alone is governed not by a Parliament, but by a military Emperor and his General Staff.

She alone makes trade and policy and finance and education "a part of war."

She alone makes war perpetually, using times of peace to get the better, not of one country only, but of every country she deals with.

She alone in times of peace uses every German at home or abroad to undermine, to spy upon, and to betray her neighbours and to weaken them against the day when she will make open war.

Germany alone has laid plans against every other power as a present enemy or a future victim.

Germany alone amongst the Powers of the earth has trampled upon the law of nations, has discarded the more humane usages of war, and has violated the decencies of life.

Germany alone amongst the Powers of the earth has denied to weak and small nations all human rights.

She alone has stripped herself of justice, of mercy, and of honour, and has made a religion of lust and cruelty and plunder.

She is envy, hatred, and malice trained to science, organised and armed.

And she is 142 millions of people under the absolute control and command of the Kaiser.

That is our enemy. What does our enemy want and what does she believe?

Germany believes that the Germans are the salt of the earth and the chosen people of God.

Germany believes that the Germans are the bravest, the brainiest, the brawniest, the most vital and most cultured race the earth has ever bred.

Germany believes that it is the will of God that she shall conquer, plunder, and rule the whole world, and that all the races of men shall pay homage and tribute to her Kaiser, fear and obey his General Staff, wear

German uniforms, and speak (but not think) in German.

Germany believes that might is right, and the weak are the natural prey of the strong.

Germany believes that necessity knows no law, and that what she covets she shall take.

All these things Germany BELIEVES. It is not I who say it. It has all been said again and again by Germans. Germany believes that "a good war sanctifies everything."

Maximilien Harden said in November, 1914: "We do not stand before the judgment seat of Europe. We acknowledge no such jurisdiction. Our might shall create a new law in Europe. It is Germany that strikes."

That is what Germany believes. Now, what does Germany want?

Germany wants the earth.

She wants the peoples of the earth under her yoke and goad, and all the fruits of their labour poured into her lap.

She wants to have great nations, like the British, the Russians, the Americans, and the French drilled or bullied or whipped into armies of German labourers or conscripts under the Mailed Fist of the Kaiser and his General Staff.

It is not I who say this. It is the Germans. The Kaiser has said: "There is only one law, and that is my law," and "Those who oppose me I will crush."

Germany wants the earth, and she means to get it by trickery and by force; by WAR. She proposes to gain her ends by dividing, deceiving, undermining, spying upon, and betraying other nations in time of peace, and by hacking, blasting, poisoning, burning, pillaging, raping,

insulting, torturing, terrorising, and enslaving in time of war.

This is not what I say. It is what the Germans have done in the past and are doing to-day.

Germany is an armed, banded, ruthless force of 142 millions of disciplined savages under the control and command of the Kaiser.

What manner of man is the Kaiser? He shall answer in his own words. In 1914, addressing the German troops on the Russian front, the Kaiser said :—

“ The Holy Spirit has descended upon Me because I am the Emperor of the Germans. I am the instrument of the Most High. Woe and death to those who resent My will. Woe and death to those who do not believe in My mission. Let all enemies of the Germans perish. God demands their destruction. God through Me commands you to fulfil His will.”

Such is the Kaiser, the master of Germany and of her Allies. Who are his Allies? The rapacious Austrians, the treacherous Bulgarians, and the unspeakable Turk.

Germany, Austria, and Turkey are the only despotisms left on the earth. And the Kaiser is their overlord and prophet.

We must never think of Germany as a democratic nation like America or France.

There is no democracy in Germany. There is no Peace Party in Germany. Germany is not a nation : She is an Army commanded by the Kaiser who told his soldiers to act like the Huns of Attila.

Germany is a tremendous organised military power concentrated upon one purpose: the conquest of the world and the enslavement of its peoples.

CHAPTER III

THE RELIGION OF BRUTE FORCE

MANY writers have tried to find out when and why Germany lost her head, and most of them think that the religion of Brute Force and Frightfulness sprang from the teaching of Nietzsche and Treitschke. But we must look further back: at least as far back as Frederick the Great.

In his "Confessions" Frederick tells his nephew: "Remember, once for all, that, in the matter of kingdoms, he catches them who can; and there is no wrong but in the case of being forced to return them."

"As to war, it is a trade, in which any the least scruple would spoil everything; and, indeed, what man of honour would ever make war if he had not the right to make rules that should authorise plunder, fire and carnage?"

There we have the Hunnish religion in a nut shell; and Frederick practised what he preached and left to those who came after him an example of knavery and violence successful.

No doubt the words and deeds of Frederick left a mark on the future rulers and captains of Prussia, but the real founders of the German war religion and war machine were Clausewitz and Bismarck: two men of genius.

Clausewitz was the great German master of war. Moltke and Bismarck were his pupils. His book on War is the bible of all German statesmen and soldiers.

Clausewitz taught that "War is a part of policy," that war should be waged "with the utmost violence"; that a Power bent on war should "make every imaginable preparation"; that one should always try to take an enemy by surprise, and that "preparation is a form of surprise." "War is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds."

Here we have the germs of all German war plans against other nations. To regard war as a part of policy, secretly to make "every imaginable preparation" to fall upon your victim by surprise, and to wage war with the "utmost violence." All these rules were acted upon by the German Government and General Staff in the wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, as in this present war.

But there is one maxim that we must ponder carefully: "War is a part of policy." What does that mean? It means, in plain words, "What cannot be got by fair means must be got by foul." As General von Bernhardt put it in 1911, "What Germany now wants must be fought for."

"War is a part of policy." That maxim does not show at first sight for the evil thing it is. But change its form and say, "Murder is a part of business," and the maxim shows its ugly teeth. If you cannot make a bargain, make a fight. If you cannot argue Naboth out of his vineyard, knock him on the head, and march in. War is a part of policy. That is the idea behind the

sabre-rattling of German diplomacy. That is the idea behind the Kaiser's bluster about "the mailed fist," and "the shining armour" and the "German sword." War is a part of policy: policy is a part of war. Brandish the sabre, blow the trumpet: "the trident must be in our fist."

But though Frederick and Clausewitz taught black sin to the German War Lords, they did not reach the German people. The first to make the German people warlike was Bismarck. This man of blood and iron did not teach by words: he taught by what is called the logic of facts. He said "The destiny of Germany must be worked out, not by articles and speeches, but by blood and iron," and, as they say in the Navy, he "made it so."

Bismarck over-ruled the Prussian Parliament, forced the Army Bill on the nation, and with von Roon and Moltke built up a new army and a new policy. He did not gain the goodwill of the people until he had defeated Denmark and Austria. His work was crowned by the defeat of the French and the welding of the German states into an Empire under the rule and lead of Prussia.

The capture of Schleswig and Holstein, of Alsace and Lorraine, with £200,000,000 of French gold, changed Germany's mind about war. Facts are stubborn things. The Germans learnt that war "pays." They no longer feared or hated war.

But the victories of 1864, 1866, and 1870 did another bad turn to Germany: they made the Germans think their armies could not be beaten, that they had only to fight and they would win.

While Bismarck was teaching Germany by means of "blood and iron" that war "pays," Professor von Lasson was working on their new-born vanity and greed with what the Greeks called "winged words." Lasson taught that Might is Right, that war is the tools of might, that the Germans are the salt of the earth and that they must break and take and rule over all.

"Between states there is only one force of right, the right of the strongest.

"It is impossible that a state should commit a crime. [He means that states have no right to make laws for other states.]

"Not all the treaties in the world can alter the fact that the weak is always the prey of the stronger.

"When once war has been declared everything is at stake, for every war is a question of life and death. It would be as weak to show mercy as it would be futile to expect it.

"The national state, representing the highest culture of its race, can only come into being by means of the destruction of other states, and this destruction can only be effected by means of violence.

"When the occasion offers, it is the duty of the state which has the power and knows itself prepared to decide questions and issues by the sword."

That is what Lasson said as long ago as 1868. In his later letters he said: "We are morally and intellectually superior to all; without peers. It is the same with our organisations and our institutions. We have no friends.

All fear us and look upon us as dangerous, because we are intelligent, active, and morally superior."

Close on Lasson's heels came two much stronger men: Nietzsche and Treitschke. Nietzsche was a wild dreamer who had read Schopenhauer, Darwin and Gobineau, not wisely nor too well, and had driven himself half crazy.

From Darwin he had got the belief that the fittest must survive, and must survive by killing the unfit; from Gobineau, a Frenchman, he had got the idea of two races of men, an inferior and superior, and that the superior, which must conquer the inferior, was the whitest race and was of the purest Aryan blood.

Out of these two false claims Nietzsche brewed a kind of hell broth, in which a race of "blonde beasts" hunted, slew, or enslaved the less blonde and less beastly race of men.

Nietzsche hated pity, said the weak should be slain. He hated law and morality: law was made to shield cowards and the weak.

"It is not work I recommend to you, but conflict. It is not peace I recommend to you, but victory.

"You say that a good cause sanctifies war. I say to you that a good war sanctifies everything.

"The harder alone is the nobler."

I need not quote any more of those ravings. Nietzsche helped to graft on to German vanity the idea that war is a natural and noble use of the highest human power. He came at a fitting time: just after the Franco-German war, when the Fatherland was, as Carlyle would say, gone almost wholly to the goose-step.

Now, before we hear Prof. Treitschke, let us notice that the false idea about the survival of the fittest was seized upon greedily in Germany, for it gave a sounding excuse for war and violence, and became as great a pet as the "law of supply and demand" and the "iron laws of wages" were in England about the same time. And there is something grimly comic in the thought of scientific Germany growing ever tipsier and tipsier on bad philosophy and false science.

To anyone who wishes to know what a hopeless "bloomer" the Kultured Germans made I would recommend Prince Krapotkine's "Mutual Aid" (Heinemann), 1s. As to M. Gobineau's nonsense about the Aryans, there is a cheap book, called "The Story of the British Race," by Prof. Munro, which is useful.

Prof. Treitschke did as much to influence the minds of the Germans as any one man has ever done. As Professor of History he taught war, and German might and German glory, and contempt of small states, and hatred of England, and world conquest, and submission to the Crown and the State; and taught it to the students, who afterwards taught it to the scholars, who wrote it in the press, and made books about it, and spoke it at public meetings. I need not quote much from him. He said what Lasson and Nietzsche and Clausewitz said.

"A conquered nation has no rights, only to be ruled by force."

"When existing conditions no longer correspond to the proportions of relative strengths, if the State cannot

prevail upon its neighbour to yield by peaceful means, then the national lawsuit commences—war.”

In fact, “war is a part of policy.” The strong must rob and rule. The weak go to the wall.

“Having to overcome one’s human feelings for the sake of the Fatherland is the horrible in war, but in that lies its greatness. Its sublime majesty consists just in this, that in war one murders without passion.”

Treitschke taught, with great heat, that England’s greatness was gained by luck, that she was worn out and rotten and must crumble to pieces soon, when Germany would take her place, and her property, and murder her sons with “sublime majesty.”

Bismarck said “When Prussia’s might is in question, I know no law.” And he proved it by his acts. When Bismarck went, the Kaiser took the helm.

The Kaiser found a new Germany ready to his hand. He found a Germany puffed up with vanity, ravenous with greed and green with envy. He found, indeed, the Germany made by the men of whom I have spoken, a Germany which admired insolence and despised kindness and good breeding, a Germany “fit for treasons, stratagems and spoils,” a Germany with a religion of brute force and a bent for “frightfulness.” And he made the most of what he found.

How anyone could take the Kaiser for a frank and peace-loving ruler is hard to understand. For his own words and his own deeds betray him. But it is certain that our statesmen trusted him, and that many of our newspapers fawned upon him: a man who so hated

Britain that he could not mask his malice: a man who was straining every nerve to make his country and his allies ready for a desperate and ruthless attack upon the liberties of the world.

Our people would not believe it. And the few who did believe it, and who believed that the war lords and the Pan-German leaders were with him in his plot, did not believe that he had the whole German nation at his back—pushing him on.

Yes, pushing him on, not holding him back. Our old idea that Germany was tricked or driven into war by the military caste was a gross mistake. That has been proved up to the hilt by the conduct of the German people, of the German Army, of the German Press, and of the German Professors since the first days of the war. Germany felt what the Kaiser felt, and meant what he meant, and they had worked on the same lines with the same aim for more than twenty years before the Kaiser gave the signal, and Germany pounced.

When we weigh the Kaiser's diplomacy and the Kaiser's speeches we find that he was always working on the German world power plan, and that he was at great pains to show Germany his cards. His hunger for naval power, his attempts to form alliances against Britain, his wheedling of the Turks, all tell the same tale.

He wanted a strong navy because he knew that he could not win world power without sea power. He wanted the help of the Turks because Turkey held the road to the East. He wanted the British Empire overthrown, because he envied Britain's power and coveted her wealth, and

because she stood in his path. He thought if he could crush Britain or lure her into a war with other Powers he could defy the world.

Let us take first his naval speeches. In 1897, he said : " Neptune with the trident is a symbol for us that we have our tasks to fulfil since the empire has been welded together. Everywhere we have to protect German citizens; everywhere we have to maintain German honour: that trident must be in our fist."

The meaning is quite plain. It means that Germany must be mistress of the seas. It means war. Only by war could Germany become mistress of the seas.

In another speech he told his people that their " destiny lay upon the water," and for fear they might not take the hint, he said : " As my grandfather reorganised the army, so I shall reorganise my navy, without flinching, and in the same way, so that it will stand on the same level as my army, and that with its help the German empire shall reach the place which it has not yet attained."

That speech was made in 1900, and the Pan-German plot for the conquest of middle Europe was mapped out in 1895. The " place which Germany had not yet attained " was her " place in the sun ": middle Europe and the railway from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. That railway was begun in 1899, the year before the speech was made.

No sooner was that speech made than it was followed by a German Navy Act, doubling the strength of the German Navy and ear-marking £250,000,000 for naval purposes.

Two years later the Kaiser, from his yacht, made signal to the Tsar in his yacht: "The Admiral of the Atlantic greets the Admiral of the Pacific."

What does "Admiral of the Atlantic" mean? It means lordship of the seas between America and Britain.

These seemingly wild words were backed by solid deeds. A great naval base was made at Kiel, the German coast was fortified, Heligoland was made into a German Gibraltar, and the Kiel Canal was widened and deepened for the passage of capital ships.

Let us take next some speeches pointing more straightly at the plan for German world power. In 1898 the Kaiser spoke at Damascus. He said:

"May the Sultan [Abdul the Damned] and may the three hundred millions of Mahommedans throughout the world, who reverence him as the Caliph, be assured that at all times the German Emperor will be their friend."

Now, Germany is not a Mahommedan Power. Besides Turkey the two great Mahommedan Powers are Britain and Russia. What could the Kaiser mean by offering his protection to the Mahommedan subjects of Russia and Britain? Such a speech was "an unfriendly act."- It was a hint at Mahommedan rebellion amongst the Mahommedan subjects of Russia and Britain. It was a hint to Turkey, who wanted Egypt. It was an impudent bid for a Mahommedan alliance and a veiled threat to Russia and Britain. It was more than that, it was the key which opened the doors of Turkey to Germany and cleared the road for the railway line to Bagdad. Less than a year later the Sultan gave the Kaiser leave to begin

the Hamburg to Bagdad railway. This speech was the first note of the call to war.

As I said before, the German plan for the conquest of the world looked like a wild dream, and as such it was regarded by men in Russia and France and Britain who ought to have known better. But let us bear in mind some facts. The Kaiser's niece was on the Russian throne and Russia was crawling with German spies and plotters. The Kaiser's sister was on the throne of Greece. Relatives of the Kaiser were on the thrones of Holland and Sweden. Germany looked upon the American and British armies with contempt. Turkey was under the Kaiser's thumb; and before the war began Austria had siezed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria was at daggers drawn with Serbia and Greece. Looked at with German eyes, the plot was full of promise. If only Britain could be kept out of the quarrel, and Germany thought she could.

The Kaiser seems to have had few doubts. As early as 1892 he made a speech in which, after speaking of God as "our old ally of Rosbach," he went on thus:

"He has given Himself such endless trouble with our old Mark [Bradenburg] and with our House that we can assume that he has not done all this for nothing. No, Bradenburgers, on the contrary we are called to greatness, and to glorious days will I lead you."

The Kaiser should have said "send you," when there is fighting toward he "leads his regiments from behind, he finds it less exciting."

In another speech the Kaiser, laying a foundation stone,

struck the third stroke, "To the future of our German Fatherland, that it may be destined in the future times by the united co-operation of our princes and peoples, their armies and their burghers, to become as strongly and firmly welded and as commanding as was once the Roman world power."

Always the same purpose, always the same promise: world power, German lordship, rule of the seas, "glorious days": in short, Pan-Germanism, naked and unashamed.

These speeches were not empty threats. They were signals to the German people that he was marching with them. Of his claims to divine right and to the dumb and blind obedience of his soldiers there are many cases, there was, for one, his speech to the German recruits in which he told them that if duty called them to fire upon their own fathers and brothers, they must obey.

How are we to account for our statesmen's unreasoning belief in the Kaiser's love of peace? All through his reign he has talked war, and made ready for war. All through his reign he has been a real Prussian. All through his reign he has threatened and boasted and conspired, as we shall see when we look into his diplomacy. Twice in five years he tried to make a Russo-German alliance against Britain.

And his people encouraged him and urged him on. The idea some still cling to, that the German people were not with the Kaiser, heart and hand in all his plots and boastings, has not a single fact behind it. In October, 1914, the *Kreuz Zeitung* said:

"No hour has been more ardently desired by us than

that of a reckoning with England. . . . Even if it were not the fact that the sins of the British are such as to make the very heavens cry out to Germany to take up the sword of the chastiser, the insults levelled at the Kaiser would in themselves justify Germany's most merciless reprisals on dastardly Albion. . . . Down on that tongue of venom with the German boot, down on it, let it be trampled into the mire from which it takes its being. Only then will it cease to lie and spue."

The Kaiser is the perfect Prussian, a King after Germany's own heart. He is insolent, he is mad for conquest, he trusts to might, and not to right, he rants about German Kultur and the German sword and "our old German God," and he is a high priest of "frightfulness, as witness his speech to the German troops starting for China:—

"When you meet the foe you will defeat him. No quarter will be given, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Attila, gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical traditions so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again even dare to look askance at a German."

There speaks your coarse Prussian, your gross German; a King after Germany's own rude heart.

The Kaiser with his mania for military uniforms, his silly joy in helmets and spurs, and jack-boots and sabres, and corslets of steel, his love of parade, his thirst for lime-

light and laurels, is the star performer of the German circus.

The German Army, goose-stepping through Brussels, when they ought to have been about that bloody business which is the "national industry of Prussia," is on a par with the Kaiser, waiting in all his "warlike ironmongery" at the head of his White Cuirassiers, to march in triumph through the streets of Nancy. He and his people are infected with the same war-fever, a malady of raw and ill-balanced minds.

When I was a child there was a poor demented creature who loved to ride about in an old yeomanry shell jacket and pill-box cap on the back of a cart horse. He used to come past our house, because a yeomanry bugler lived next door, and as he rode by, with his cap cocked and one arm akimbo, he would shout to the bugler: "Blow your horn a bit, boy, blow your horn a bit." Had he been a king he would have wanted to ride through Nancy, or Vienna, or Berlin, at the head of his victorious army. "O, the sorry trade."

In 1908, after abusing King Edward VII., and vilifying and threatening the British people to an American Journalist, the Kaiser came to England, and told the *Daily Telegraph* how he loved us. I will quote a few sweet lines:—

"You English are mad, mad—mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are so completely given over to suspicions quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command, in my speech at the

Guildhall, that my heart [the same heart that bled for Louvain] is set on peace, and that it is one of my dearest wishes to live on the best of terms with England. Have I ever been false to my word? Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my nature."

The grand old Prussian gentleman. Had he ever been false to his word? What sunny frankness. What touching candour. What heroic lying.

And yet, although at that time the open hearted Kaiser's professors, pressmen, soldiers and statesmen were gnashing their teeth at us, and rolling their eyes at us, and biting their thumbs at us, and rattling their scabbards at us, the British people believed him, and more than one gifted Editor gushed over "the Kaiser, that true friend of England."

In Germany, with the Kaiser's aid and blessing, there had been formed Pan-German leagues and German leagues with millions of members, led by all the grand Panjandrums of the nation. There was a Navy League a million strong; and books and pamphlets, and sermons and articles, lauding Germany and belittling or threatening Russia and France and Britain, were falling everywhere like the gentle rain from heaven. And all the while our British wiseacres were cooing about eras of peace, reductions of armaments and the lamb-like mildness of "that great friendly power, Germany." So that to breathe a hint that a wolf's throat might be hidden in the soft white wool was about as tactful as whistling the Boyne Water in a West of Ireland shebeen.

"Methinks," said our good old Field Marshal, in the

midst of the flowery dance, "methinks that shrewish squealing hath the measure of a war-march." "Fool," shouted the burly chief of Cloan, "those be the pipes of Pan."

In the year of Grace 1911 there came out two German books whose "barbaric yawp" was shrill enough to wake the mummies in the British Museum. But they failed to wake the House of Commons. One of these books was a most brutally frank confession of the dangerous Pan-German plot for the conquest of the world. It was written by a pleasant Prussian gentleman named Tannenberg, and its title was "Greater Germany." The other had the warning title, "Germany and the next War," and was writ by a fiery Jingo General named von Bernhardi. How any person could read those books and not smell brimstone is a great big wonder. But if our rulers scented mischief they gave no sign. Like Brer Rabbit, they "lay low and said nuffin." And the drums of Armageddon sounded louder still and nearer. And the people of Great Britain "slept comfortably in their beds," and their guardians snored serenely like the "ancient and quiet watchmen" that they are.

Von Bernhardi worked on the lines of Treitschke, but dotted the i's and crossed the t's. He said that war was a "biological necessity," that it was the fount of all good, that the weak must give way to the strong and all the rest of it. But he went farther and spoke more plainly. He said that war with England was inevitable, and he gave some hints as to how rebellion could be fomented in India and Egypt and South Africa. He said there was no hope

of making friends with the French, and in the next war "France must be so completely crushed that she can never again cross our path." He said Turkey would be useful to Germany in the next war and therefore Turkey must not be driven out of Europe until she was no longer needed by Germany. He said Germany must have "world power or downfall," and that what she wanted "she must fight for."

As to German culture: "No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriate all the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind gifts richer than it received. To no nation except the German has it been given to enjoy in its inner self that which is given to mankind as a whole."

As to war: "War is a biological necessity . . which cannot be dispensed with."

"Strong healthy and flourishing nations increase in numbers . . . they require new territory. Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors—that is to say, by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity . . . It is not the possessor but the victor who then has the right."

As to the Right of Might: "In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things."

However, in case the "very nature of things" might go

wrong, the General favours the well-known German methods of setting other powers by the ears, of making "every imaginable preparation," of taking them by surprise and "isolating them" so as to fall upon them one by one and beat them in detail. We shall meet the General again when we come to study German diplomacy.

Just at the time von Bernhardi's book swam into our peaceful sky like "a bright particular star," Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, answered the British offer of a halt in naval outlay with true Teutonic courtesy, said he:—"When a people will not or cannot continue to spend enough on its armaments to be able to make its way in the world, then it falls back into the second rank and sinks down to the rôle of a "super" on the world's stage. There will always be another and a stronger there who is ready to take the place it has vacated. The condition of peacefulness is strength; the old saying still holds good, that the weak will be the prey of the strong."

"Tannenberg's book was a bold bare statement of Germany's plans for world conquest. It was the world power plot "writ large," and its maps were like red lamps signalling danger. There is no need to quote from Tannenberg: the German plan has been made clear in our first chapter.

Tannenberg was followed by Frymann and others in 1912, and those who wish to probe the German lust for wealth and power will find all they want in "Germany's Annexationist Aims" (John Murray), 3s. 6d.

What Germany wants is the earth. Where Germans

differ is as to how much of it they can take over, or as to which parts of it they shall take first.

Before the war, when one pointed to the signs of German greed and hate the answer made was that the writers named did not really stand for the Kaiser and the German people.

But we have proofs now that the Kaiser and the people were of one mind, and that Treitschke and Lasson, Tannenberg and Bernhardi spoke that mind quite truly.

We have proofs stronger than mere words. We *know* how the Kaiser and his servants worked and plotted. We know that Turkey and Bulgaria were won over, that Bosnia and Herzegovina were seized, that the Hamburg to the Gulf railway was built almost as far as Bagdad, that the railways of invasion were pushed up to the Belgian border, and that when all was ready Germany went to war.

And we know that the Germans have complete mastery of the Balkans, that brave devoted Serbia has been crushed, that the Germans hold Belgium and the mining districts of France, and that they were only stopped from taking the French Channel Ports by the heroism of the British and French troops in the great battles of Ypres.

The more we think over the events of the war, the more we study the Pan-German books and the speeches of the Kaiser, the more strongly is it borne in upon us that the German plot for world conquest, called "the Pan-German Plot," was not a dream—it was a plan.

We must never lose sight of this plan nor of the Bagdad railway upon which it depends for success.

We must never forget that the plan has the eager support of the whole German race.

We must not underrate the formidable power of the 142 millions of disciplined people ruled and directed by a single will.

To learn what the danger is, and how great it is: this is necessary if we are to meet it and defeat it.

Germany trusts in the sword. The sword is might and might is right. Germany has appealed to the sword. She will not be deterred from her purpose by words. Words are not deeds. She despises words. Only when the sword is broken or beaten from her grasp will she listen to such terms as to us mean bare safety. Neither can her word be trusted. She does not profess to keep her promises.

In this war we have but the one alternative: to conquer or be conquered.

CHAPTER IV

THE CULT OF FRIGHTFULNESS

THE plea that the German atrocities in this war were perpetrated against orders, were against the wishes of the Kaiser, the General Staff and the German people ; and that they have been magnified by the Allies is a "terminological inexactitude."

For fifty years the gospel of frightfulness has been preached in Germany ; and the Germans, prone to violence, prone to hatred, rude in their language, coarse in their manners, have been apt pupils.

So far from its being alien to the feeling of Germany or to the tradition of the German Army, Frightfulness is part of the German code of war and is looked upon by soldiers and civilians alike as a useful and proper part of tactics and—business.

The crimes which have stained the flag of Germany on land and sea are not fables, they are facts ; are not few, but many ; are not less, but more horrible ; were done not in hot but in cold blood.

The barest list of these crimes would fill a huge book, and many of them are too bestial or too revolting to be told.

We will deal with this cult of studied and methodical fiendishness in proper order. We will begin with the great

German war god, Clausewitz:—"To introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity. War is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds."

That is what Clausewitz taught, "War is an act of violence which knows no bounds." As for treaties, he put them aside as futile, as for "laws of war" he speaks of those as "hardly worth notice."

And when he comes to the matter of "living on the enemy's country," and the matter of that form of plunder called "requisitions," he is as ruthless as Bismarck or von Bissing. These tolls on the civilian enemy, he says, should be "enforced by the fear of responsibility, punishment and ill treatment which in such cases presses like a general weight on the whole population. *This resource has no limits except those of the exhaustion, impoverishment and devastation of the whole country.*"

It was Clausewitz who said "All things are lawful, but all are not expedient." In making war, or in conducting war, we are to ask, "Is it expedient to do it, and have we the power to do it?" We are not to ask is it right to do it? If we have the power to do it, and if it will pay to do it, we have the right, for might is right.

What did the two great pupils of Clausewitz say, Bismarck and von Moltke?

Bismarck said to the invading Prussians in 1870: "You must leave the people through whom you march only their eyes to weep with."

Von Moltke would not hear of the rule that only the soldiers of the enemy should be attacked. He said that

"On the contrary, all the resources of the enemy, country, finances, railways, means of subsistence, even the prestige of the enemy's Government ought to be attacked."

Both these pupils of Clausewitz believed in what is called "the policy of *saigneur a blanc*": Bleeding the enemy white.

Here, then, we have the hall mark of Germany's three greatest soldiers stamped upon the engine of Frightfulness.

As to the Kaiser, the present war lord, we have seen how he told his soldiers to "take no prisoners," to "give no quarter," but to act like the Huns of Attila. And we have seen how he told his soldiers on the Russian front that all who opposed his will must perish, and that God had ordered it.

But we have not yet reached the depths of German infamy. Clausewitz taught that war is a part of policy, but the Germans have gone past that; they have made war a part of business; they have arranged atrocities on "business lines."

In making war the Germans are moved by three passions: vanity, hatred and greed. When they take up arms it is partly to satisfy their insane desire for glory and for mastery; partly to slake the fire of their malice; and partly in the beaten way of trade.

As for their warlike vanity, I have dealt with it in the person of the Kaiser. Of their mean malice and their eagerness to wound and insult we have evidence in their treatment of prisoners, in their unspeakable outrages on French and Belgian women, in their murders of Nurse Cavell and Captain Fryatt, in their air raids upon London

and Paris and their bombardment of English open towns.

But even here we have not plumbed the deeps of their baseness. The sinking of allied and neutral merchant ships and the murder of their crews; the destruction of villas and villages and towns, the burning and smashing and stealing of furniture, and wine, and pictures and pianos, and the levying of fines upon Belgian and French cities *are not acts of war, nor are they crimes prompted by hate and anger only: they are BUSINESS.*

Every sailor drowned or prisoner maimed or murdered; every child or woman killed, makes one less rival soldier, or mother, or workman.

Ships are sunk to hamper food supplies; but there is another aim. *Germany hopes that after the war she will be able to snatch the carrying trade of the world, and she sinks the allied and neutral ships so that there may be so many less to trade against her.*

When she rifles the French and Flemish shops and factories and sends the machinery to Germany; when she destroys the fruit trees and slaughters the cattle and burns the houses and farms she acts in cold blood and with the purpose of injuring her rivals trade and impoverishing the rival Government and people. No other people in the world would be capable of such studied villainy.

But what does *this* mean? Herr Beumer, a member of the Reichstag, said in February, 1917: "Anybody who knows the present state of things in Belgian industry will agree with me that it must take at least some years—assuming that Belgium is independent at all—before Belgium can ever think of competing with us in the world

market. And anybody who has travelled, as I have, through the occupied districts of France will agree with me that so much damage has been done to industrial property that one need not be a prophet in order to say that it will take more than ten years before we need think of France as a competitor."

What further proof need we ask that the German atrocities, like the German retreats, are "carried out to plan?" There we have it: fire and carnage and plunder, wreckage and murder on the strictest business lines. "War: the national industry of Prussia."

Let us go back to frightfulness in its military form. General von der Goltz, a famous war lord, said in his book, "The Nation in Arms," published before the war, "Inexorability and seemingly hideous callousness are among the attributes necessary to him who would achieve great things in war. In the case of Generals there is only one thing for which history never pardons them, and that is defeat."

The same gallant officer and gentleman, speaking of the inevitable war with France, said that the French were "to be exterminated by all the forces at our disposal, and by the most complete means of destruction."

Tannenberg wrote in 1911: "War must leave nothing to the vanquished but their eyes to weep with [the Germans love that phrase]; modesty on our part would be purely madness."

Treitschke, as we have seen, said that "the conquered have no rights."

In the official German War Book sent out by the General

Staff there is a very sinister rule: "a war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the combatants of the enemy state and the positions they occupy, but it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual and material resources of the latter." [That is the people.]

Of this passage Prof. Morgan says that the word "intellectual" is not a full translation of the German word used, which is "geistig." Now, geist means spirit, and the order in the War Book is an order to break the spirit of the people, to scare and cow them, to destroy or seize their goods, and in short to "bleed them white," and "leave them nothing but their eyes to weep with." See "The German War Book" (John Murray), 3s. 6d.

The excuse made by the Germans for their wanton butcheries and atrocities in Belgium and France was that some of the French and Belgian civilians fired on the German troops, and it is the German rule in such cases to inflict the most "frightful" punishments upon whole towns or villages in which such acts occur.

Now, without going into the truth or falsehood of the German stories about civilian acts of violence, though there is no solid evidence behind the German charges, it must be stated here emphatically, that this rule of frightful reprisals is a German-made rule and is a violation of the laws of war.

It has been agreed upon amongst civilised nations that civilians not in uniform if caught in the act of firing upon the troops of an enemy may be summarily dealt with by court martial. *But* civilians not in uniform have a perfect

right to take up arms against an invader in defence of their homes and towns.

Now in the Franco-German war of 1870-1, the Germans broke that law. Not only did they shoot irregular soldiers in uniform, but they punished a whole village or town for the acts, or the alleged acts of a single man.

In this war they have gone farther still. A boy sleeping in the house in which a gun was found was shot in the presence of his mother.

Prominent and wealthy citizens were arrested and held as hostages where no illegal acts had been committed, and were fined or shot if any wild report came in.

It is now an established custom of the Germans to expect attacks by civilians and if none occur to invent them and then proceed to carnage and fire and frightfulness.

I shall not give any examples here. They will be found in the various official reports on the Belgian and French atrocities. It is enough to say that the Germans burnt and looted many towns and villages and in some cases massacred and tortured several hundreds of men, women and children.

My object here is to point out that these outrages are illegal as well as inhuman and that they are premeditated acts of frightfulness of the kind recommended or ordered by Frederick, and Clausewitz, and Bismarck and Moltke, and von der Goltz, and Hindenburg and the Kaiser.

But before we quit this subject I will give an example of German logic.

It is, as even the Germans admit, illegal to destroy the lives of civilians unless those civilians have committed acts

of illegal war. But, according to the German rule, any civilian guilty of illegal acts of war may be shot.

Now, when the Zeppelins dropped bombs on unarmed villagers in undefended villages in the middle of the night they acted illegally, even under the German rule.

But all the Germans had to say on the subject was that some villagers had fired on the Zeppelins and had thereby rendered their villages liable to destruction.

The same view is taken by the Germans of the acts of their submarines. For a German submarine to sink a merchant ship and drown her crew is against all international law. It is even against the German rule, unless the merchant ship has fought against the submarine.

Yet the German submarines sink ships on sight, and if a merchant ship attempts to fight they regard that as an illegal act of war. It was for that offence that the Germans murdered Captain Fryatt.

So it has come to this at last that the Germans may murder civilians if they do not defend themselves and may "execute" them if they do.

The pretence that German officers are not to blame for the outrages committed by their men is sheer effrontery. Who is responsible for the murders committed by submarines and Zeppelins? Who was responsible for the shelling of Scarborough and Madeira? Who was responsible for the murder of Captain Fryatt? How can Germany explain away the words of Bismarck and Clausewitz and the Kaiser?

As for the German Officers they do not wait for the war to exercise their murderous and brutal passions. We all

know of the Zabern case in which a German officer struck down a cripple ; and of the Kiel case in which two working men having by accident brushed against a naval officer, were immediately stabbed by the officer with his sword and killed.

And now I will make a final quotation from the German War Book. It will be seen that the War Book says international law does not forbid certain practices. That is true, but it is only because international law never thought it possible that such practices would be considered possible by any modern power. The War Book says :—

“ Indeed international law is in no way opposed to the exploitation of the crimes of third persons (assassination, incendiarism, robbery and the like) to the prejudice of the enemy.

“ The ugly and inherently immoral aspect of such methods cannot affect the recognition of their lawfulness. The necessary aim of war gives the belligerent the right, and imposes upon him, according to circumstances, the duty not to let slip the important, it may be the decisive advantages gained by such means.”

Now, it is quite certain that assassinations were committed in Russia by agents of the German Government, and there we have the official justification of the acts. The belligerent has the right, and the right may become a “ duty,” of using the knife of the assassin or the torch of the incendiary.

“ Everything is permissible, but everything is not expedient.” When murder becomes expedient it becomes a

duty. "Necessity"—when it is German necessity—"Knows no law."

We find, then, that Frightfulness is taught to the German officer and soldier by Germany's greatest King, Frederick, by her greatest war authority, Clausewitz, by her greatest general, Moltke, and her greatest statesman, Bismarck.

We find that Frightfulness is inculcated by the Kaiser and by the German War Book, issued by the General Staff, and we have seen that it is put into practice by Generals and Admirals and officers of the German Army and Navy.

And by way of a little mental exercise let us try to imagine the effect on public opinion in this country if the King had made a speech like that of the Kaiser quoted above, or if Generals French, Robertson, Douglas Haig, and Smith Dorrien had issued to our Army a War Book in which assassination was approved of as a duty.

Frightfulness is part of what President Wilson calls "The thing we are fighting against;" and the thing is—Germany.

CHAPTER V

THE WAR AND PEACE MACHINE THE DOUBLE PERIL.

WE have seen that Germany, unlike all other nations, makes war all the time. To understand that we must understand the German war machine. What is the German war machine?

The German war machine is unlike the French, Russian or British war machine. In other nations the war machine is a special service standing and working quite apart from the business and the business life of the people. In peace time British and French trade, industry and commerce are not in touch with the Army, the Navy or the Government. French and British firms compete against each other, at home and abroad. Their Chambers of Commerce have nothing to do with Government "Secret Service."

When we examine the German war machine we shall have to keep in mind at every step our knowledge of civil and military affairs in Britain.

The German war machine is not the Army and Navy only; it is Germany: the whole power of Germany, the organised power of the German empire and its Allies built up and trained for use against all other nations, in peace as well as in war.

Every adult male in Germany is a soldier, and nearly

every civilian belongs to a kind of reserve. These are parts of the war machine which makes war all the time.

In Germany there is a Peace machine. No other nation has a peace machine. In no other country are the civilians organised or controlled. What is the German peace machine?

The German peace machine is the German war machine. The two machines are one machine. They are not separate parts of one machine, they are the one and same machine working in different ways at different times.

In peace time the German war machine is disguised as a peace machine, but it always makes war.

Directly war is declared the peace machine changes colour, and is a war machine. Then at once German science, agriculture, industry, and finance, with the German Press, are mobilised—for war.

The German peace machine is the German war machine fighting with goods and words and money and—spies.

The German war machine is the German peace machine fighting with artillery and rifles and submarines, and newspapers and—spies.

The German peace machine is the German people out of uniform.

The German war machine is the German people in arms.

In times of peace America, Japan and China may be our trade rivals; but they are not our enemies.

But Germany in times of peace is a secret or open enemy of other nations as well as a trade rival. She does not only trade with them or against them, she plots and intrigues against them.

Bernhardi says that "Trade rivalry is latent war." As Germany acts, trade rivalry is real but stealthy war. War is a part of business; business is a part of war.

Traders of other nations trade to make wealth. German traders trade to make wealth, but they also trade to spy upon and to gain political or financial power over their rivals in their own countries. We must never forget these differences in the way of trade between Germany and other nations if we are to understand Germany and the war.

The German trader is like a burglar who bribes or seduces the servants of a house he means to rob.

The German peace machine, like the German war machine, is preceded and accompanied by armies of spies.

There is even a difference between German spies and other spies. German spies do not confine themselves to spying out the land; they also bribe and corrupt the people with whom they deal, and build up hostile and seditious organisations in friendly states.

The German civilian immigrant or visitor to a foreign country is a soldier without his helmet and sword. He is an agent in advance of the war machine.

Treitschke said, "Every good subject is a latent, and if needs be, an active spy."

Money is the sinews of war. The German peace machine makes money.

Spies are the pioneers of invasion: the German peace machine trains and uses and pays an army of spies.

Let us now find out how the German peace machine is organised and worked at home.

The backbone of German trade is made up of the Banks, the Customs, and the Kartels.

It is by means of the Kartels and the Banks, backed up by import duties and bounties, that Germany carries out her dumping.

A Kartel is a "trust" or "syndicate" of trades or industries.

These trusts make binding agreements as to output, markets, profits and prices.

Each Kartel has a monopoly of a given district, and all the firms in the Kartel work together as to output and prices. It is as though one wholesale grocer had the whole trade of Yorkshire, and another of Surrey, while all the wholesale grocery firms in England agreed to buy and sell at the same prices, to divide profits, to share losses, and not to run counter to each other in foreign or home markets.

But there is another rule of the Kartels. Instead of selling goods more cheaply where they are produced, they sell them more and more cheaply the farther they get from their point of production.

It is as though our coals should be dearer at the pit mouth than they are on the south coast; as though instead of coals rising in price on the road from Durham to Portsmouth they should fall in price.

This enables the Kartel, or trust, to sell the surplus at a low price abroad: that is, to "dump" goods in a foreign country and undersell the native dealer.

But the Kartels often sell under cost price where they wish to cut out or ruin a foreign trader or to capture a foreign market. In such cases the Kartels pool the losses. "Commercial rivalry *is* war."

Under the Kartels the German retail dealer becomes a mere agent. He may only buy from his local Kartel. He may only buy or sell such goods as the Kartel allows; and the buying and selling price and the quantity he may sell are all fixed by the Kartel.

This system is fortified by import duties on foreign goods, and is backed by a banking system peculiar to Germany.

The difference between the German and British methods of banking can be told in a few words. To put it crudely, the British banks are less ready than the German banks to lend money.

There is a good account of the German Kartel and banking system in "The Coming Trade War," by Messrs. Farrow & Crotch (Chapman & Hall), 2/6, from which I will here quote:—

"What is the German banking system? It may be described as one that recognises as the true function of a Bank, the feeding, stimulating, and encouragement of industry. . . . In Germany the business man, the merchant, or the trader, who desires to increase his activities, to extend a particular line of his wares, or to launch out into new markets, has only to apply to the bank to be provided with the requisite capital."

Of course, the German banker does not lend without a proper knowledge of the business he lends to.

“In England . . . the individual trader, shop-keeper, merchant, or manufacturer who goes to the bank for an overdraft must have collateral security, and his business must be one that has been firmly, and for long, established; and even then the required assistance may not be forthcoming.”

Now, it is obvious that the Kartels, with such banks to help them, with the foreign imports held by duties, and with the aid of Consuls and technical schools and reports from clouds of commercial spies abroad to guide them, have a great advantage over the easy-going, plain dealing, unorganised traders of other countries.

Working as “Trusts,” the Germans can standardise produce of goods, centralise output, and manufacture in large quantities. And it is clear that a firm which makes a certain article by the million can make it and sell it more cheaply than can a dozen rival firms, each of which makes a hundred. And it is clear that if one factory makes only blades and another only hafts the knives will cost less than if haft and blade were made by the same firm.

Behind the German Banks and Kartels there are the organised battalions of German science. It is well known that German trade makes more general and intelligent use of science than does our trade. As bearing upon that point, I will refer to another useful book: “The Elements of Reconstruction” (Nesbit and Co.), 1/-, which should be read with the book by Messrs. Farrow and Crotch.

This book is very clearly and brightly written, and is not “dry” at all. The authors take by way of illustra-

tion the great dye question. They say "What is true of dyes will be found with a rough parallelism to be true of metallurgy, engineering, the electrical industry, and so on." They point out that the Germans exploited a British discovery because Germany was able to get to work with a large class of mediocre chemical investigators, while Britain had no such class available. Then comes the bright passage:

"But then comes the implication that, had Britain laid down, as one lays down wine, a few thousand chemical students in the eighties and nineties to mature, at a cost, let us say of a thousand pounds a head or so, nothing of the sort would have happened, and all that we have to do now after the war is, first to set aside an annual million ear-marked 'Chemists,' and then all these arrears will be made up to us. But indeed the business is not so simple as that."

Here I pass by a merry picture of the "Apathetic British Employer," and come to the following arresting passage:

"But the broad fact in the business issue between Britain and Germany during that last quarter of a century has been a country of a great number of little hundred-thousand-pound businesses, so to speak, with a tradition of mutual competition—indeed, competition preached as a gospel—and Germany has been a country of fewer and of co-operating five-million-pound businesses and combines."

The authors then point out that whereas a five-million-pound business may employ a great many chemists, it

does not follow that a hundred-thousand-pound business can employ a proportionate number, or indeed, any chemists at all. And then:

"And although the colleges of the State on business lines turn out chemists and investigators by the myriad, it does not follow that they will be sufficiently employed, at least until they can learn to live on the wages of a boy clerk and experiment in an outhouse for the love of knowledge and their employer with three test tubes and a bunsen burner. . . . In other words, big businesses, progressive methods, and scientific research, come together, and must come together. Syndicating businesses and organising scientific education and research are two aspects of the same job."

That is the idea. And I think anyone who, with an open mind, reads this book and the book on "The Coming Trade War," will agree with me that it is a good idea, and a sound one.

Behind all this machinery is the machinery of bureaucracy, of the schools, of the press, of the police, of the civil service, all drilled and disciplined, all directed to the one purpose, all permanently mobilised. As Mr. Austin Harrison says, in his book "The Kaiser's War" (George Allen), 2s. 6d. :

"If we consider that every second man in Germany has an order, a title, a ribbon; is a servant of the State; is necessarily a soldier, and is consequently so bound socially and professionally to the integument of the State administration, vamped of all power of political criticism, protest, or initiative, we can get an idea of the remarkable

singleness of power wielded by authority, which thus arrogates to itself not only the rights of administrative functions, but absolutely dominates the national design. There is no opinion on national policy other than that fabricated in the foreign office."

There is nothing immoral in the German mobilisation of banks and tariffs and kartels. There is nothing immoral about a crowbar; but—in the hands of a burglar.

The German peace machine is built and used for war.
And it never makes peace.

The signing of peace will be the signal for the German peace machine to reopen its attack, with renewed violence.

The German peace machine at home is described by Messrs. Farrow and Crotch as: "A solid wall of protection under cover of which Germany discharges her gunnery into the other markets of the earth."

CHAPTER VI

THE WAR MACHINE AT WORK

GENERAL VON SNEAK

THE German war machine, in its character as a fighting machine, is the pride and hope of Germany. War has become the "national industry" of Germany as well as of Prussia.

Prof. Roland G. Usher, an American, shows in his book, "Pan Germanism," published before the war, that the whole German nation was rabid for expansion and world conquest and seething with hatred of the British.

Since 1871 Germany has had unbounded faith in the Army. While her contempt for the armies of France and Russia was only exceeded by her contempt for the army of Great Britain. Trained from childhood to think war and learn war; bred in an idolatrous worship of soldiers and a devout belief in German invincibility, the German people looked to the great war machine to win for them all that their vanity and their envy and their greed could desire.

When, in 1913, the Chief of the German General Staff said in Brussels that war with France must come and must come soon, he added that on the day war was declared an overwhelming wave of enthusiasm would sweep from one

end of Germany to the other. And his prophecy came true.

Now although the war machine, as fighting machine, holds the first place in the pride and hope of Germany it is a fact that as a war machine the fighting machine proved far less effectual and far less dangerous than the peace machine.

This fact is not generally understood by the British people, but it is a fact of the utmost importance and until we give it its due weight we cannot understand nor meet the real German danger.

Let us begin with the first article of the German faith: that the German army is invincible. This belief is due to the successes of German arms in the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870. What are the facts?

The defeat of Denmark was nothing to boast of. What chance had the small Danish army and nation against the forces of Prussia and Austria? It was a fight of two big men against one small boy.

In the war with Austria, Germany had the better generalship. But we must bear in mind that Austria was taken by surprise; that she had to fight Italy on one side and Prussia on the other, and that the Prussian troops were armed with the breech-loader against the muzzle-loader.

In the war with France Prussia had all the cards in her favour. She had the near experience of two wars. She had the advantage of surprise. She had superior numbers. The ground had been sown with spies, and the French generals, favourites of a corrupt Imperial Court, were mostly incompetent.

Certainly the Prussian army was better organised, had

more artillery and was better handled than the French. Just as certainly France had no general to compare with Moltke and no statesman to compare with Bismarck.

No one will deny that the Germans fought well. But I think no one who knows military history or has seen the German and French armies at work will deny that the French are better soldiers than the Germans.

However, Germany did not think so. Germany had heard and read so much about the matchless courage and skill of the German army that she expected to defeat France in a few weeks, and as for the British they were not seriously taken into consideration.

And so in the August of 1914 the invincible German army began its triumphal march to Paris. What really happened?

In the first place it was very soon seen that Moltke the second was not Moltke the first, and that Bismarck was dead. In the second place it was soon borne in upon us all that in General Joffre the French were blessed with a very great general.

As a fact Joffre out-generalled the Germans from the first, and at the battle of the Marne defeated them and destroyed their hope of ever reaching Paris.

I am not going to say much about the fighting on the western front. Major Macfall, in "Germany at Bay" (Cassell and Co.) 6/-, has done it better than I could hope to do it. But I want to make clear the most important fact that after the battle of the Marne and the battle of Ypres the Germans, so far as the western front was concerned, were beaten.

And having given the result of those battles, I will call as a witness the great German war god: Clausewitz.

Up to the hour of defeat on the Marne the Germans were attacking (or thought they were). After the Marne they fell back on the Aisne and—stayed there. Again, in the battle of Ypres the Germans were attacking, and their object was Calais. But after the battle of Ypres the Germans remained where they were.

I think it is correct to say that from that day the Germans have never made any real advance. That is to say they have been “reduced to the defensive.”

Now Clausewitz, who is the greatest German authority on war, says most plainly in his book, which is the German generals’ bible, that the culminating point in war is the point at which the attack turns into defence. Let us quote his own words: “Often, in fact almost universally, there is a culminating point of victory. Experience shows this sufficiently. It is necessary to know how far our preponderance will reach, in order not to go beyond that point, and instead of fresh advantage reach disaster,” and he gives as that culminating point: “The point at which the offensive changes into the defensive.”

Germany reached that point after the battles of the Marne and Ypres. When she reached that point she ought to have made peace, and as a matter of fact, she began to fly her peace kites very soon afterwards.

That is all I need say about the strategy on the western front. As to actual fighting the Germans in this war have never, under equal conditions, been a match for the French and British armies.

It is true that early in the war, chiefly through mistakes of one or two of the French generals, or on account of superior numbers they scored. But since the Marne they have never won a battle although they have fought many with odds of three to one in their favour and with overwhelming advantage of artillery.

At the battle of Ypres, though they had ten guns and a hundred shells to our one, their army of 600,000 was defeated by very little more than a hundred thousand British and French.

During the war on the western front the French and British armies have thrashed them like sacks in a score of pitched battles. From first to last they have been out-generaled and out-fought.

As a fighting machine the German war machine in France and Flanders has been a failure.

On the Russian front the results have been the same, so far as concerns generalship and the fighting quality of the troops.

Time after time the Russians defeated the German and Austrian armies. No allied soldier will deny that the Russian soldier is a better fighting man than the German, nor that the Russians have several generals of greater ability than any German general, Hindenburg and Mackensen not excepted.

But if the French and British and Russians out-generaled and out-fought the Germans, how have the Germans contrived to hold out? I have often been asked that. It is quite simple.

The art of strategy (generalship) has been said to consist in bringing two men against one.

In 1914 as in 1870 the Germans gained this advantage without generalship: they gained it by surprise. They were able to invade Belgium and France with superior numbers and superior artillery and before the French and British were ready.

They were thus able to take up a strong position in the enemy's country, which gave them a great pull.

Now let us look at our own position, and first let us give a few lines to a simple sum in strategy.

We have all heard of "beating an enemy in detail." That means the defeat of an army or a fleet piecemeal. Suppose a naval battle to begin: a German fleet of thirty ships attacks part of a British fleet of thirty ships and defeats ten before the rest comes up. The odds will then be in favour of the Germans who will have perhaps 25 ships against 20.

Suppose there are two armies opposed to each other, each ten thousand strong. The British army sends two thousand men to attack the 10,000. The 2,000 are destroyed, and again and once again the British send 2,000, and they are destroyed. It is quite clear that after those three battles the Germans will have the advantage in numbers. They will have, perhaps, 8,000 as against 4,000.

Now that is something like what happened in this war. We first sent our 80,000 men to Mons, where they met more than three times their number with ten times their guns.

Next we sent something like 100,000 men to Ypres.

Where they fought six times their number. The battle of Ypres was a British achievement such as the invincible German army never approached in all its history.

As the war went on our old army, the Contemptibles, were nearly wiped out. Their place was filled by Canadians, Indians and Territorials. These held the enemy until the new army began to arrive, and so it went on.

We were continually meeting large armies with small ones. That was because our people would not take warning years before the war, and so we were not ready.

Had the German army been half as good in quality as our own, they would have wiped us out before the new armies were ready.

On the other hand had Sir John French at Mons had at his disposal the numbers which Sir Douglas Haig has now, and the munitions and the guns, the Germans would have been chased across the Belgian border, and it would all have been over in a year.

And again had Russia been trained and organised as Germany was, and had the Russians not been betrayed by traitors and robbed by knaves Russia alone would have beaten Austria and Germany combined.

And this brings us to the proof of what I said just now, that the non-combative action of the German war machine is more effectual and more dangerous than the action of the war machine as a fighting machine.

As a fighting machine the German war machine has not proved equal to the French, the British or the Russian. All the German successes (for they are not victories) have

been won not by fighting, but by treachery: by spying and intriguing and other forms of "sneaking."

Yes. The one great German general is General von Sneak. General von Sneak took back from the Italians in a few days all they had won by the finest courage, skill and labour in a year of war.

General von Sneak did what Napoleon failed to do, what Hindenburg and Mackensen tried in vain to achieve: he routed the Russian armies, and defeated Russia.

It was General von Sneak, also, who overthrew Rumania and almost annihilated Serbia.

And how did he accomplish it? He accomplished it by means of the German peace machine. He accomplished it by spying and intriguing; by plotting and bribery; by spreading lies and fomenting sedition amongst the people.

The German peace machine is more formidable than the war machine. And the peace machine is always at work, always at war, never makes peace.

We may beat the war machine only to be beaten in our turn by the peace machine. We must bear it constantly in mind that after we have beaten Hindenburg and Tirpitz; Mackensen and Ludendorf, we have to meet the craftiest and the strongest of all the German war lords: General von Sneak.

Who is General von Sneak, and what has he done? We will study him in his meaner office as a general all-round *sneak*.

CHAPTER VII

THE PEACE DANGER

IN Germany's deep and far-reaching system of spying and intrigue the military, political and commercial agents and methods are so closely knit together that they cannot be wholly disentangled.

That the commercial and other civilian spies help and serve the army and the Government, is as certain as that the Government and the army help them.

In other countries the "Secret Service" is wholly military and political; business men do not work in squadrons, and they employ no spies.

But for the Germans: their ambassadors are spies (and worse), their consuls are spies, their attachés are spies, their merchants and bankers and men of science are spies; their commercial travellers, their agents and mechanics are spies; their managers and clerks are spies; their governesses, barbers, singers, fiddlers, waiters, and domestic servants are spies; their pilots and sailors are spies; their tradesmen and publicans, and even their missionaries are spies; their princes and princesses are spies; their Kaiser is a spy.

And all these spies are worse than spies, they are scouts of the war machine, and they work to undermine foreign trade, to filch trade secrets, to gain financial and com-

commercial control in other countries, to capture key trades, to ruin trade rivals, and to sow seeds of sedition, discontent and rebellion amongst the people of neutral and friendly states.

German spying, intrigue and treachery have been carried on in all parts of the world, but most keenly in Russia, America, Italy, France, Belgium, Turkey and the Balkans.

Ten years ago, perhaps five years ago, no one in this country would believe this. But during the war so much has come to light that even British and American faith has been shaken.

It will be enough if I deal here very shortly with German treachery and spying in three States: Russia, Italy, and America. In the next chapter we will look into that form of secret commercial warfare known as "peaceful penetration."

Before we speak of German treachery in Russia, let us recall a few facts which come more closely home to us. We *know* that the Germans caused the rebellion in South Africa. We know that they have tried to foment revolutions in India, Egypt, the Sudan, Persia, and Ireland. We know that they tried to urge the Amir of Afghanistan to make war on us. We know that the Kaiser, while assuring us of his friendship, was trying to form alliances to destroy us, and we know that Prince Henry of Prussia, who was made much of in English society, was a spy and hated us.

Russia has been more or less poisoned by German influence for more than three hundred years. From the time of Peter the Great to the eve of this war the Russian

Court, Russian society, Russian trade, finance, industry and agriculture have been open fields for the sneaking treachery of German princes, barons, mechanics, labourers, and other spies. There were in Russia German newspapers and German schools known to true Russians as "German forts." In the early sixties the Russian secret police was "reformed" by the infamous Stieber, Bismarck's spy-in-chief, and a fine thing he made of it.

For years before this war Russia was infested with German spies and secret agents. The Empress was a spy. Many ladies of her court were spies. Trade and commerce, the army, the diplomatic service, the civil service, and the church, had all been more or less corrupted, or disorganised, by German agents. These agents urged on the people to revolt, and urged on the authorities to measures of severe repression. They wormed their way into munition works, arsenals, factories, hospitals and barracks.

Before war was declared, Germany knew that the Russian army organisation had been paralysed, that the railways were disorganised, that Russia was short of arms and munitions, and that the food supplies were inadequate or out of gear. I was told all this by an amiable gentleman on the Dieppe to Newhaven boat. But I would not believe it. I have since had reason to admit that the gentleman knew more than I did, and to suspect that he knew too much. Claiming to be a Dutchman, he was a rabid pro-German, and his bitterness suggested more feeling than was proper in a neutral. He said "Russia has millions of men; but not soldiers. She has perhaps

a million of soldiers ; but not armed. Her railways ! Her Government ! Ah, against Germany she will be like herds of cattle and walls of turf."

That gentleman landed at Dieppe and passed the barrier. I never met him again. Perhaps he is interned.

But he spoke the truth : he *knew*.

By means of German bribery and treachery and corruption, Russia's armament, supplies and communications were ruined. Her food supplies were congested or misdirected.

By means of German intrigue, helped by traitors, with the Empress and the bestial Rasputin at their head, the Russian armies were betrayed. The plans of her generals were handed to the enemy. Her treasury was robbed. Guns and shells and cars sent from England were passed on to Germany.

Rasputin and the Empress interfered with the movements of the armies in the field, superseded or dismissed her generals, and betrayed her allies. Rumania was sold by Steuemer. The Grand Duke Nicholas was sent to the Caucasus by Rasputin. Loyal Russians who interfered were assassinated. Fortresses were surrendered or disarmed.

In spite of good generalship and desperate valour, the Russian armies were forced to retreat. They had few guns and fewer shells. The soldiers were not half of them armed and were short of ammunition, short of clothing, boots and food. Such is the Russian spirit that the army almost succeeded in spite of all these drawbacks. Again and again they defeated the Austrians and the Germans.

And then the Germans tricked the people into revolution.

There is no doubt of that. M. Wesselitsky tells us:

“After the destruction of the German Embassy in Petrograd, the only act of popular fury against Germany in Russia, there were found in a room in which Count Pourtales was said to have indulged in amateur photography, 60,000 proclamations appealing to Russians to rise against the very Government to which the German Ambassador was accredited. It is now also authentically proved that the great strikes in Petrograd during the French President’s visit last July were instigated by the same Embassy.”

And Mr. Carl W. Ackerman, an American, who was in Germany at the time, says that Russian anarchists and revolutionaries who were prisoners in Germany were released and sent to Russia to help to make the revolution.

Nor is there any need to doubt that German agents in shoals have been working in Russia to prevent the Republic from restoring order and to turn the people against the Allies. Russia has been defeated and broken for the first time, and General von Sneak has done it.

And what are we to make of the Italian disaster on the Isonzo? Will any sane person believe that within a few weeks the Austrian or German armies captured by strategy, or tactics, or hard fighting, 250,000 Italian prisoners and 2,000 guns?

General Cadorna stated that “some divisions had not offered effective resistance.” Press correspondents said that some divisions had thrown down their arms and run

away. They did not run from the Austrian guns and soldiers they had so often defeated. They ran from General von Sneak—or rather they ran after him.

Italy before the war was nearly as much a prey to German intrigue as was Russia. Since the war began General von Sneak has done his utmost to spread suspicion and disaffection amongst the Italian troops and people, and there is no doubt that the effects of the Russian revolution helped in Italy, as they did in our own country and in France. Especially were the cries of “an early peace,” and “no annexations and indemnities,” and “a democratic understanding,” well considered by the German spies and agents in Russia who suggested them.

As to America. We know that Germany tried to draw Japan and Mexico into an alliance against the United States. We know that the Austrian Ambassador to the U.S., Dr. Dumba, and the German Ambassador, Dr. Dernberg, were spies and incendiaries, and that the German Attachés, Boy Ed and von Papen, were spies and incendiaries and were sent about their business.

We know that German agents in the U.S. tried to organise armies of German-American reservists to raid Canada, and that they tried to blow up bridges and canals and munition works, and sink ships, in Canada and America.

We know that German agents did their best to stop the supply of American munitions to the Allies and to make trouble between Great Britain and America over the blockade and the mails. We can prove all this and more, on American evidence.

But I shall only cite one witness : President Wilson, the President of the United States. We all know that Dr. Wilson did not want war. We all know that he has displayed exemplary patience under trying provocation. But German arrogance and German treachery and German offences against the laws of the United States left him no option. And when at last President Wilson called upon the American people to defend the lives of American citizens and the honour of the flag, he spoke to some purpose. And amongst other plain passages in his fine speech was this testimony :

“ One of the things that have served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could not be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities, and even our offices of government, with spies, and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of council, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce.

“ Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here before the war began ; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proved in our courts of justice, that the intrigues, which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country, have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States.”

In the German Secret Official Report, quoted in the French Yellow Book, there are some very meaning words :

“Risings in time of war created by political agents require careful preparation by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication. They should have a guiding head, who might be found among influential religious or political chiefs. The Egyptian school is specially suited for this.”

Now, when we read those words and remember the action of the ex-Khedive of Egypt, and M. Bolo, and M. Cailleaux, and all their train, we must be very stupid if we cannot put such an obvious two and two together.

In 1866, four years before the Franco-German war, the German chief spy, Stieber, planted nearly 40,000 spies in France. Amongst these spies a number of “pretty Prussian women” were placed as waitresses in the French army canteens. There were also some hundreds of women domestics, and about five thousand gardeners, farmers and vine-growers.

But it was not until 1880 that the Germans, at that time spending £750,000 a year on the secret service in France alone, began to tamper with the French labour movement and the army. One of their plans, which was only defeated by the boldness of a French minister in mobilising the bulk of the railway workers, was to foment a general railway strike which would paralyse the French railways, and leave the country helpless before an invading army.

Shortly before the outbreak of this war Australia was visited by the British Association of Science. Germany sent four of her most distinguished professors: Dr. Penck,

Dr. Goldstein, Dr. Grachner, and Dr. Pringsheim. *And they were all spies.*

Two of the scientists left Australia. One got clean away, one was arrested and found in possession of maps and information about Australian defence. Two others were detected and interned. One of them, Dr. Penck, on his arrival in England was recognised as a gentleman who was much interested in the "geology" of the Isle of Wight.

Another German professor who was allowed to study the "geology" of our east coast presented the German war office with a set of splendid maps.

To grasp the real "inwardness" of such conduct we have to imagine men like Professor Ray Lankester or Sir Oliver Lodge, or the late Sir Robert Ball, going as scientific guests to Germany and bringing back war maps, coast soundings, and details about German harbours, forts and camps. Such conduct is unthinkable in England. *But in Germany it is done.* It is part of the system. German science is a lever of the war and peace machine.

In 1889 the Kaiser arranged the marriage of his sister with the Crown Prince of Greece (ex-King Constantine). This princess and her husband were in communication with Berlin, and were trying to arrange for an attack by the Greek army on the left flank of General Sarrail's army at Salonika. In November, 1916, the Kaiser telegraphed to the Queen of Greece: "The intervention of Tino with his forces co-operating against Sarrail's western flank would bring about a decision in Macedonia."

Yet the traitor, King Constantine, was allowed to go to

Switzerland there to conspire and work against the Allies at the head of a powerful organisation of spies. As the German officer said: "We shall never be gentlemen, and you will always be fools."

Mr. J. Price Jones (America) says:

"Germany's spy system has been the sword hand of her statesmen and her diplomats. When this war is over and the world learns of the counter-moves and Machiavellian methods of German diplomats, with their intrigues, secret understandings, and their daring attempts to force this country into dangerous situations, people will realise more clearly than to-day what a marvellous system has been behind many seemingly casual developments in this country."

"In the United States, Germans—reservists, army officers, representatives of the German Government—have been indicted for crimes against Federal laws. These violations were committed without doubt in a self-sacrificing spirit with the aim of helping the Fatherland. Germans, or German influences, have been behind schemes in violation of neutrality laws and restraint of trade. *They have attempted arson, bribery, forgery, engaged in military enterprises, caused explosions in ships and factories, resulting in many deaths, and have set fires in ships and factories.*"

"They have participated in plots against Canada, Ireland, and India, all developed in the United States under the supervision of the German representatives of Berlin, though often ostensibly carried out by anarchist tools. *The activities of the German agents, multitudinous*

in detail and variety, all have been designed to hinder the Allies in their prosecution of the war, to cause a breach between the Allies and the United States, to embroil this country in a war and to accomplish other secret aims of the General War Staff. In all the propaganda, German secret agents and official representatives of the German Government have not only worked with utter disregard to American laws, but have endeavoured to place the United States in a position of being secretly unneutral."

It is not possible to give in full the proved charges against Ambassadors Dumba and Dernberg, and the Naval and Military Attachés Boy Ed and von Papen. But in "The German Spy System in America" (Hutchinson), 3s. 6d., a great deal of useful evidence will be found.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PEACE MACHINE ABROAD

AS I have said, German military and civil spying and conspiracy are so closely knit that one cannot part them. But as to the greater danger of the so-called "trade war" we must remember always that there is less harm in importing German goods than in importing German men. It is by the export of Germans that Germany undermines and poisons the nations she wishes to conquer.

In 1909, Henri Andrillion pointed out that a paper called the "German Export Review," which is only issued to Germans, said: "If one wishes to conquer a country economically, and for all time, it is essential to begin with the export of men."

What is meant by the "export of men"? Simply the entrance of Germans into the life or business of foreign countries. Let us take a few examples. M. Jules Claes (Belgian), in "The German Mole" (G. Bell & Sons), 2s., says that the German clerk is the microbe of the German canker.

He is recommended because he wishes to learn the language, or the business. He asks for no salary. He attends to the business. He attends to it so well that he worms out all the secrets which, with lists of the customers,

he sends to Germany. He also attends to the "import of men," so that, as M. Claes says, "in a few years you will not have a single compatriot in your firm. All will have been replaced by Germans." And M. Claes goes on to say that in Antwerp and other places the old Belgian firms have been turned into German business houses. M. Lucien Nicot (French) shows how French firms and trades were captured systematically by the Germans. A single German would get a place in the business. He would keep touch with the Fatherland (the peace machine) and soon he would work in a German friend. Others would follow until the German garrison got power, when all the best posts would be filled by "the enemy." This is called the group system. It is well known in Italy and France, and is not, I am afraid, unknown in England.

In Russia the invaders do not come by "single spies, but in battalions." After the Russo-Japanese war, M. Wesselitsky tells us: "Systematic colonisation by Germans of the frontier provinces of Russia was hurriedly pushed forward." During this war these German colonists have provided Germany with her most useful spies. When in 1910 M. Wesselitsky spoke of the German colonisation of the Vistula region to the Russian Prime Minister, M. Stolypin answered that "he recognised the gravity of the matter, but there was a much more actual danger in the German immigration into the South-western Provinces, which took the form of a systematic invasion." The German peace machine at work: the "export of men."

In "The Bloodless War," M. Ezio M. Gray (Italian)

gives a terse account of the spread of the German cancer in Russia. Of tools, electrical apparatus, optical instruments and lenses, chemicals, printing, industrial machinery and drugs, from 80 to 100 per cent. of the Russian supply came from Germany.

In agriculture, gas, and breweries it was nearly as bad. The German hand had a grip on the banks, the railways, the metals, agriculture and land.

"It will be observed that whether by German ownership of Russian soil, or because they were imported direct from Germany, the products of prime necessity were, at the beginning of the war, in German hands. These were products which might place Russia at the mercy of the country which produced them: the factories might be shut down, and a commercial or military conflict might interrupt importation."

That is what happened when war began. Germany closed down on Russia her peace machine trap, and Russia was left almost helpless, exposed to shell-shortage, shortness of arms and the danger of starvation. That is an example of what is known as the capture of "Key industries." We must look into this, as it is one of the most deadly weapons of the "peaceful German trader."

Key industries are industries upon which other industries depend. Coal, for instance, is a key trade. If a foreign country can hold up our coal supply that will stop our factories, munition works, our shipbuilding, and our navy.

Now, let us note the difference between our selling

British coal to Germany and our allowing Germans to buy our coal mines and sell the coal to us. Our own coal.

Yet that is the kind of thing the German peace machine works for. They did it in France, in Russia, in Italy, and in the British Empire. Not with coal to any large extent, but with other things which the different countries needed in their industry and trade, and would need still more in war time.

In one of those priceless speeches which Mr. Hughes has made in this country, he said: "What stupendous folly it was that placed in the hands of Germany the monopoly of tungsten powder, essential for hardening our steel." The facts are that in a district of Southern Burma, which we have held for a hundred years, there is an abundance of wolfram ore, from which tungsten is obtained. It was not until 1908 that the first consignment of wolfram ore was shipped from this district of Tavoy. By 1914 Burma was producing a quarter of the world's consumption of wolfram ore. *"It all went to Germany, for the Germans had quietly stepped in and secured the whole output."* This ore produces tungsten, which is used in the manufacture of armour-plate and guns. Having read, marked, and inwardly digested that revelation, we will move on to the next: "On the outbreak of war the Tavoy wolfram industry almost collapsed. *The processes by which tungsten was extracted from wolfram ore existed in Germany, but not in this country.*" Tungsten is essential in the manufacture of guns and armour-plate. Says "The Times": "Although tungsten had become practically an essential element in the making of munitions we

were actually sending the ore to the Germans and buying back the finished product." That was in the years between 1908 and 1914.

There seems to have been nobody in this country, or in this Empire, in commercial or Government circles capable of seeing that danger. But in Germany the Government and the traders worked together for the capture and exploitation of the wealth of foreign colonies and possessions.

On the outbreak of war Australia, which is one of the greatest metal-producing countries in the world, realised that "not only was the whole vast metal industry of Australia in the grip of German capital, but the Australian companies were bound by contracts to restrict the sale of their products to certain agents who were sending the ore to Europe for treatment." Those agents were Germans trading under British names. Owing to this German "control" Britain was paying £90 for spelter in America, while Germany paid £30 for spelter produced mainly from Australian ores.

What did Australia do? She passed the War Protection Act. Says Mr. McLaren: "Every German contract was annulled, every German trade mark cancelled, and every company given three months' notice to strike every German shareholder, naturalised or not, off their register."

What an outrage on the sacred fetish of Free Trade. It is enough to make Richard Cobden turn in his grave. But Mr. Hughes, the Australian Premier, formerly a Free Trader, has hardened his heart. This is what he says:

"It is no longer possible to maintain that the economic policy of a nation has no relation to its national policy. The relations between the two policies are indestructible, intimate and complex. To ignore it means not only to provoke, but to ensure national disaster. For a certain period the commerce of a nation which treats commerce as though it had no relation to the national security, may prosper, as has happened in our own country; but the day of reckoning comes for the nation as it has come for us. We ought not to commit the criminal error of building up our industries upon a foundation controlled by the enemy."

Germany has understood and carried on this form of secret warfare since the time of Bismarck. What did "the man of blood and iron" say? "The flag follows trade: first the trader, then the soldier." Which is quite natural when "the trader" is a spy and an advanced scout of the army.

The author of "The Bloodless War," E. M. Gray, puts the idea as follows: "The national industry of Germany follows the German bank. First the banker, then the manufacturer. After these two the spiked helmet of the Uhlan should make its appearance." And he quotes Herr. Schmoller, who said of Brazil:

"We ought at any cost to desire that during the coming century there shall arise in Southern Brazil a German territory of twenty to thirty million inhabitants. However, without the guarantee of a chain of warships, without the possibility of armed intervention on the part of Germany in Brazil, such a future is imperilled."

"We see," adds Mr. Gray slyly, "how the spiked helmet of the Uhlan follows close upon the banker and the manufacturer." The flag follows trade. The Uhlan and the warship follow the banker and the manufacturer. The German consul, the German waiter, the German ambassador, and the German clerk are parts of the German war machine.

What Mr. M'Laren says of German and other national "colonies" in foreign cities applies, as I have often pointed out, to German traders and financiers and the traders and financiers of other nations. In Paris there is an American "colony." In every large Australian city there are French and Italian "colonies."

"In what respect do these colonies differ from the German? They have never exploited local national feeling: they have never agitated for their own schools. The churches used by the rest of the community are good enough for them; their clubs are not centres of political propaganda; they have never been in direct communication with their own home Government. French and Italian "colonists" have not been "missionaries" nor spies." Says Mr. Gray:

"France and England have economic systems which live and let live, and the French economy does not ally banking with industry, and sells its product and invests its money without political preoccupations."

The British emigrant or trader goes to a foreign country, as do all foreigners except the Germans, to work or to sell his goods. He does not go as a spy or as a member of an organised machine to displace or disorganise native indus-

tries, or to meddle in native politics. German trade is part of the war. Every German immigrant, consul, or trader is a member of the German war machine.

He enters a foreign country with professions of friendship, but he is an enemy and a hostile soldier in disguise.

Before the war we met Germans in every English town, in every trade or business. Nearly all these men were soldiers, or had been soldiers, but we did not think of that. If our barber had worn a grey-green uniform and a round cap, if the waiter who brought our lager beer had worn a spiked helmet and had a bayonet at his hip, if the affable commercial traveller had called for orders in his Jager dress, and the banker had stood to cash our cheques in the uniform of the white cuirassiers, we might have been given "furiously to think;" but all these men were bland and docile as so many Southdown sheep.

Yet it is just such quiet, attentive, almost servile Germans of whom Mr. M'Laren is thinking when he describes the gentle art of commercial espionage and conspiracy in the following words:—

"It has been a movement in the nature of a slow conspiracy. Its agencies constituted an elaborate but invisible network of commercial treachery combined with political espionage. Germany has been carrying on war against the British Empire for a much longer period than two years . . . It is a campaign carried on by a variety of arms—spies, traders, big financial organisations, religious missionaries, schools—having for its ultimate goal the weakening politically of the community in which its agents work . . . It has been warfare on scientific lines, its activities have

been co-ordinated, it has been part of State policy . . . Their pursuits have been and were intended to be a source of hidden peril to the State which harboured them."

Organisation will always beat disorganisation. Now our manufacturers, unorganised, have had to fight against the organisation of the German Government, the German commercial, military, and political machine, and the German people.

I protest that it has not been a fair fight, and that the way to improve things is not, as some think, to leave them as they are.

In Germany no one makes any mistake as to the nature and purpose of what is called "peaceful penetration," amongst themselves they speak plainly, as when they describe the German *Banca Commerciale* in Italy as "the head of the German line of penetration beyond the Alps."

In France and Italy they say "Every German is a spy," and in France at any rate they know the German better than we had reason to know him.

At Luneville a party of German soldiers under the orders of a non-commissioned officer burnt down the house of Madame Lectere. The sergeant found the two safes and sent them to the train for dispatch to Germany. *He knew the house* and the town very well, for he had often been welcomed there when he used to come as a civilian and a hop merchant. Oh, he was such a pleasant gentleman, Herr Weiss, and he did a thriving trade in hops.

A Belgian gentleman, writing from Ghistelles during the first days of the German invasion, said that German horse-dealers were recognised amongst the Uhlans.

At Herenthout the peasants saw a Uhlan lieutenant coming towards them. The lieutenant called out "Don't you recognise me? I sold you a scythe last year."

A young German clerk had been treated by his English friends as one of the family. He was called to the colours when war was declared. His English friends went to see him off and took him presents of chocolate and fruit and cigarettes. After they had bid him good bye and wished him luck, and as the train moved forward, he leaned out of the window, with his eyes blazing with anger, shook his fist at them and shouted, "Wait till we Germans come to England, and we will give you hell."

In uniform or out of uniform, in peace as in war, it is never wise, it is never safe to trust a German.

Germany is not a nation: she is an army. Her peace machine is her war machine. She believes that might is right and that she is chosen by God to plunder and enslave the rest of the world. There is no German democracy. There is no German peace party. Germany is an armed band of 142 millions of murderous robbers under the sole command of the Kaiser.

GERMAN DIPLOMACY

CHAPTER IX

IN view of the Prime Minister's attempts to define our war aims, and in view of the remarkable attitude of a section of British labour towards our German comrades—unhappily estranged—perhaps a few words on German diplomacy might not be out of place.

Prussian diplomacy of old, and German diplomacy since 1871, have aimed at setting foreign Powers by the ears, at making alliances and cross alliances, with the object of duping their Allies, at tempting other States with promises they did not mean to keep, and at discarding solemn treaties, when they were inconvenient, as "scraps of paper."

Professor Morgan, in describing the diplomacy of Bismarck, has drawn a true portrait of Prussian and German statecraft from the time of Frederick the Great to that of the Kaiser. The Professor says: "To reinsure Germany's future by taking out policies in different countries in the form of secret treaties of alliance, while concealing the existence of other and conflicting treaties, seemed to Bismarck, not only astute, but admirable."

Frederick the Great, in his "Confessions," says to his

nephew: "Never be ashamed of making alliances, and of being yourself the only party that draws advantage from them. Do not commit that stupid fault of not abandoning them whenever it is your interest to do so."

And Frederick was as bad as his word. When in 1762, Peter III. came to the Russian throne, he gave back to Frederick, whom the Russians had defeated, East Prussia, Brandenburg, and Pomerania. Frederick showed his gratitude after the Prussian manner: he tried to egg on the Khan of the Crimea to invade Russia.

Let us now look into the diplomacy of Bismarck and of those German statesmen who have followed him.

In 1862, Bismarck ordered the German War Minister to prepare a plan for the invasion of Denmark. In 1863, he assured the Danish Minister in Berlin of Prussia's friendship. In 1864, he cajoled Austria (whom he meant to attack) into an alliance with Prussia, and they attacked Denmark. After the defeat of the small Danish Army, Prussia annexed Schleswig and Austria Holstein. But Bismarck took care to leave a bone of contention so that he could pick a quarrel with Austria.

In 1865, Bismarck sent his chief spy, Stieber, to plant an army of spies in Bohemia. In the same year the Prussian Chief of Staff, von Moltke, and Minister of War, von Roon, paid a visit to the Emperor of Austria, and at the same time inspected the country in which they meant to fight and defeat his armies.

In 1866, Bismarck, having bribed Napoleon III., and humbugged Italy, fell upon Austria and defeated her.

In 1867 Bismarck sent the Spy Stieber, to organise an

army of spies in France, along the roads by which he meant to invade that country. At the same time he vowed the warmest friendship for the French.

In 1870, when all was ready, Bismarck published an unsigned treaty with Napoleon III. against Belgium, and this kept Britain neutral.

But Russia had still to be kept from helping France, and Bismarck did it in this way. He first hinted to Russia that if she liked to defy the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris he would stand by her. When Russia took the bait Bismarck lied to Lord Granville. So Russia got her way, and Bismarck got her out of his way.

In 1870 Bismarck tricked France into war, making it look as if France were to blame. France was defeated, and the Prussians seized Alsace and Lorraine and made the French pay an indemnity of two hundred million pounds.

This indemnity of £200,000,000 was the making of Germany. It helped to build her peace-and-war-machine and to increase her army and her trade. It also lit in the hearts of the Germans the fire of greed. Henceforth Germany looked upon war as a business that *paid*.

Meanwhile Bismarck was busy. In 1875 he wanted to "finish France off," and would have made war upon her but was stopped by Russia and Britain. Bismarck was angry that he had not got more money out of France. He wanted to "Bleed her white."

Shortly afterwards he persuaded Austria to stir up the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to rebel against the Turks. Austria did it. The Turks fell to massacre and

outrage. Bulgaria and Serbia rebelled, and Bismarck urged the Russians to fight the Turks and rescue the Slav Christians. As Russia hesitated, Bismarck told her Minister that Russia could depend on his friendship and said: "It is in the traditions of Austria to keep a dagger in her bosom in order to strike a friend; it is not Germany who would be guilty of such dastardly policy." At the same time he was secretly warning Austria that Russia harboured hostile designs against her.

Trusting Bismarck, Russia fought and defeated Turkey. She forced Turkey to give up Bulgaria, Serbia, Rumania and Macedonia. But this Treaty (San Stefano) had to be judged by Europe. At the Berlin Conference Bismarck was entrusted with Russia's case. "He was," as M. Wesselitsky says, "to arrange everything in the best way; and he arranged everything in the best way—for Germany."

Macedonia was handed back to the Turks, by which act Bismarck laid the foundation of the present Turkish alliance with Germany.

Bosnia and Herzegovina were put under the "protection" of Austria—who "protected" them for thirty years, and then swallowed them; and Russia paid the piper.

This treaty, which robbed Russia of the fruits of her victory, caused ill-feeling between Russia and Britain, to Bismarck's profit and joy, and drove Austria into the arms of Germany.

To stir up strife between Austria and Russia, between Russia and Britain, between France and Italy, and

between Britain and France was the pet policy of Bismarck.

The same line of diplomacy was followed by the Kaiser and his Ministers after Bismarck's dismissal.

In 1896, after the Jameson raid, the Kaiser sent his telegram congratulating President Kruger. In 1897 the Kaiser went to Damascus, where he threw a sprat to the Sultan of Turkey (Abdul the Damned). He said: "The Sultan, and the 300,000,000 of Mahommedans under his rule, who reverence him as the Caliph, will always find in the Emperor of Germany a friend." That was a bid for the friendship of Turkey and a threat to Britain and Russia.

In 1899 or 1900 the Kaiser tried to get a secret treaty with France and Russia against Great Britain, but Russia and France declined.

In 1904 the Kaiser almost persuaded the Tsar of Russia to make a Russo-German alliance against Great Britain.

Whether or not Germany helped to bring about the war between Russia and Japan in 1904 has not yet been proved, but Germany turned that war to her own advantage in her own way. M. Wesselitsky tells us: "Lack of space does not allow me to relate here the German wiles in order to involve Russia in a war with Japan. After succeeding in that, Germany gave Russia an apparently generous guarantee of the safety of the Russian western frontier (Russo-German frontier) and an assurance that she would not undertake anything in Europe to the disadvantage of Russia. Immediately afterwards, however, she began to press for the conclusion of a Russo-

German treaty of commerce, and during the negotiations the German Government made capital out of its 'generosity,' frequently hinting that it would be put to a severe test should Russia not prove her gratitude by far-reaching commercial concessions! "

Finally, some years later, when the agreement was made public in Russia, "competent Russian specialists were able to point out the one-sided charges it imposed on Russia, so that in fact *the treaty amounted to the payment of an immense tribute.*" The German diplomatic arm of the great peace-war-machine is well up to its work.

Now, in 1905, while Russia was at war with Japan, and when the Russian Fleet was about to start for the East, the Germans warned the Russians, secretly, that Japanese torpedo boats were lurking in the North Sea. This led to the Dogger Bank incident. The Russians said they saw torpedo boats. They fired and sank some British trawlers.

This was a German trick to cause trouble between Britain and Russia. It failed.

Now, I was told afterwards, by a man in the Russian secret service, that there were torpedo boats near the Dogger Bank; but they were German.

Was that true? It is a curious fact that after the Russian Fleet had crossed the Bay of Biscay the British mobilised a fleet of 200 warships at Portland, and brought up four battleships from Vigo. And I find upon referring to the "National Review" of the year 1905 that the Germans at that time were tremendously excited and mobilised their fleet. The "Review" suggested that the Germans, who pretended that they were afraid of a British

attack, were really getting ready to make an attack on us. But I think my friend the spy was right. I think our people got news about the German torpedo craft and mobilised the fleet against an expected German attack. At any rate the Dogger Bank incident was quickly "squared" between Russia and Britain, and the Germans had the "wind up" about something.

In 1908 Russia, being involved in debt and her army being unready, and her people disaffected, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina (which contains 75 per cent. of Slavs), and when Russia protested Germany threatened war. Russia gave way.

In 1911 the Germans saw a chance of a grab in Morocco, and the affair of Agadir caused friction and would have caused war between France and Germany had not Britain stood firm. This left the German people very sore; but the Kiel Canal was not ready, and the Kaiser would not fight.

In 1912 the Balkan League—Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria — defeated the Turks. Directly afterwards Austria urged Bulgaria to attack her Allies, Greece and Serbia. Bulgaria took the hint, and was badly beaten.

Why did Austria do that? For two reasons. First, because Germany and Austria did not want a powerful Balkan Union in the way of the Bagdad line from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, and friendly with Russia; and, second, because with Bulgaria driven into the arms of Austria, and the King and Queen of Greece (the Kaiser's sister) favouring Germany, the task of smashing Serbia would be easier.

This kind of diplomatic knavery is beyond the ken of the British public, but the German public understood it and approved of it. Of this approval I can give no evidence in the space at my command. Suffice it to say that when the treacherous Bulgarians turned upon their Balkan allies in 1912 they fired the signal shot for Armageddon. From that hour the war was only a question of time, and the time was two years. The Kiel Canal was ready in July, 1914, and the war began in August.

In 1904 when France and Britain came to an understanding about Morocco, the *Rheinisch Westfälisch Zeitung* said: "Bismarck taught us that it was in the interests of Germany to set England and Italy by the ears with France. The result in the Entente is a complete change in the international situation, and not to Germany's advantage."

General von Bernhardi, a devout pupil of Clausewitz and Nietzsche and Treitschke and Bismarck, spoke very bluntly in his book, "Germany and the Next War," published in 1911. He said that had Germany backed up Italy more firmly: "We should have considerably strengthened Italy's position in the Mediterranean and created a cause of contention between Italy and France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance."

Speaking of China and Japan he says: "If the two nations joined hands—a hardly probable eventuality at present—it would become difficult for us to maintain an independent position between them. The political rivalry between the two nations of yellow race must therefore be

kept alive. If they are antagonistic they will both probably look for help against each other in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to retain their possessions in Asia."

But his remarks upon America and Great Britain are still more startling: "Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American war of Secession, a rival to England's world-wide Empire has appeared on the other side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of North America, which are a grave menace to England's fortunes."

No sense of honour. Just the Prussian idea to cozen rival nations into war, just the Prussian idea that one should fall upon a friend from behind when he is in danger or trouble, just the Prussian idea of stealthy watching and sudden pouncing on a man or a nation in a "tight place." Yet another instance: "A financial or political crash in Portugal might give us the opportunity to take possession of a portion of the Portuguese Colonies."

A real Prussian gentleman. The Kaiser was of like mind when we were mixed up in the Boer War. He told his people: "We are in bitter need of a strong Fleet," and he went on to say that had he been listened to and had the Fleet been ready "How differently should we have been placed for pushing our interests over seas" If only his fleet had been ready he would have pushed his interests in South Africa. Was ever an honest burglar so curbed by the lack of a life preserver?

"Turkey," says the gallant General, "is the only

Power which can threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short sea route to India. We ought to spare no sacrifice to secure this country as an ally. Turkey's interests are ours." And so the Kaiser thought.

One more diplomatic hint and we will salute the General and leave him:

"Let it be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be reasonable prospects that Russia for a time would remain neutral. If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents we must initiate an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England that both those States would feel themselves compelled to attack us."

There speaks the true pupil of Bismarck: the real, ravenous, unscrupulous Prussian.

Count von Bulow also "doth somewhat smack, somewhat cling to, he has a kind of taste": a taste of Clausewitz: for he explained that during the Boer War, when the Germans ("that great friendly Power") were itching to have a fling at us they felt that "bitter need" of a strong fleet. Said he: "Our neutral attitude during the Boer War had its origin in weighty considerations of the national interests of Germany. Our navy was not strong enough for us forcibly to achieve a sufficient sea power in the teeth of English interests."

So the "great friendly Power" feigned friendship. As von Bulow says: "It was a question of avoiding a quarrel with England until we had built our fleet."

“ Every imaginable preparation,” and “ preparation is a form of surprise.”

We see then that the German religion of hate and the German gospel of frightfulness, and the wild and whirling words of Nietzsche and the guided fury of Treitschke, and the cold logic of Clausewitz, and the cynical treachery of Bismarck, and all the threats and bluster of the German professors and the German press fit in like parts of a design with German diplomacy and with the German methods of making war. Be stealthy, be treacherous, be thorough, leave nothing to chance, pounce suddenly, strike ruthlessly, rend and beggar and cow and horrify your enemy, and you will be able to buy hills of sausages and lakes of beer and to march your parade marches at the goose step in the proudest cities of the world.

Behold the matchless legions of the invincible All Highest prancing in triumphal order.

“ Blow your horn a bit, boy; blow your horn a bit. Make way for Attila, the scourge of God.”

CHAPTER X

LAWLESSNESS AND FRIGHTFULNESS IN ACTION

FRIGHTFULNESS is so foreign to the British soul that our people can hardly believe, or even understand that the atrocities of which the Germans are guilty have been really perpetrated.

Instinctively the Briton, with his bent for "moderation" and compromise clings to the hope that these crimes have been few in number, or have been made to look worse than they are.

Even if he can be brought to believe that the charges are proven and the crimes many, his readiness to forgive and his quickness to forget tend to wash the lesson from his mind.

But this is a lesson that ought not to be washed from his mind. It is a lesson it behoves him to take to heart and to remember.

The lesson should be stressed and repeated, because the Briton is not helped in his understanding and remembrance of German frightfulness by those strange mental freaks whom we call pro-Germans.

We all know how these peculiar people have tried to whitewash the enemy; how they feigned at first to look upon all reports as inventions; how, when proofs were

given, they pleaded that there have been atrocities in all wars; and how in the face of the multitude of witnesses and the monstrous mass of crime they still try to serve the enemy by a "conspiracy of silence."

The crimes of Germany in this war are of two kinds. One class of atrocity rests upon the testimony of witnesses, and the reports of commissions. The other kind stare the whole world defiantly and insolently in the face, and can neither be questioned nor denied. We will deal with this class first.

We all *know* the crimes of the submarines. We know that the U Boats have sunk merchant ships and passenger ships and hospital ships; and that they have sunk those of neutral Powers as well as those of enemy powers.

We know that in this illegal and inhuman form of warfare the U Boats have fired upon the crews and passengers in the boats or in the water, or have left them to drown.

We know that they have put prisoners on the decks of their submarines and have then submerged and left the prisoners to die.

We know that in this piratical warfare the U Boats have drowned ten thousand British seamen, thousands of neutral seamen, and hundreds of women and children.

Who can remember any pacifist or pro-German condemnation of the submarine warfare?

I know of none. But suppose *our* submarines had acted in the same way against German and neutral ships, what would our pro-Germans have said? They would have "roused the very stones to mutiny." And they would have done right.

But they did not do it.

Neither have our sailors been guilty of piracy and murder. The atrocities of this war are wholly German.

We *know* that German warships shelled open and unarmed towns. We know that they bombarded Scarborough and the Hartlepoons, and that they shelled the pretty town of Funchal in innocent Madeira. And we know that they would have done more and worse if our Navy had not kept them at bay.

We *know* that the Zeppelins dropped bombs on sleeping English villages and harmless health resorts. We know that all Germany was panting with a feverish desire to hear that the Zeppelins had burned London or had murdered thousands of the London people.

And we do not know what the pro-Germans said against those outrages; because they never said it.

We *know* that in France and Belgium, in Serbia and in Poland, the Germans burnt or bombarded towns and villages; cut down fruit trees, slaughtered cattle, looted mansions and villas, cottages and factories, shelled cathedrals and ancient buildings, and shot or bayoneted thousands of civilians: men, women, and children.

But if the pro-Germans know these things they have been significantly silent: they who are so fond of talking.

To throw up their unwonted silence into sharp relief let us imagine, if we can, how pro-Germans would have raged and melted and burned had our armies been guilty of the sack and pillage of Louvain, the massacres of Dinant and Aerschot and Termonde, and the plunder and destruction of a hundred villages and towns; or had our soldiers been

the first to use poison gas, or had our airmen dropped bombs on Munich, or Hamburg, or Berlin.

We know that the Germans sent tens of thousands of Belgian, French, and Russian civilians, men, women, and children into exile and slavery.

We *know* that they insulted and tortured and murdered our wounded. We *know* that they shot Nurse Cavell and Captain Fryatt.

All the atrocities and crimes in this war have been on the German side. No allied country has been guilty of the like breaches of military or international law. No people but the Germans, and their allies, are capable of the inhuman ferocity and moral filthiness which have disgraced the Kaiser and his Kultur for all time.

But the pro-Germans are so shocked that they have never uttered a word of protest.

As I have shown before, all those German crimes were perpetrated by order of the Kaiser or the General Staff. They were official and deliberate acts of a devilish policy, and were conceived and carried out in cold blood.

We will now take a few cases of the second kind of crimes, generally classed as "atrocities." I shall not cite many, nor the most revolting. There is no need to blacken the page with horror. But it is needful to show the kind of crimes the Germans perpetrate and the sort of fiends they are.

There is no need to say much as to the treatment of our wounded: the facts are too well known. How the Germans made British and French prisoners herd with Russians sick of typhus and typhoid; how they flogged

and kicked and set dogs upon our men ; how they marched wounded prisoners in file past German soldiers who spat upon them or struck them ; how a German loafer, under the notice of a German sentry, thrust his fingers in the blind and bleeding eye of an Irish prisoner, half of whose face was shot away ; how they allowed French and British wounded prisoners to lie on the bare floors of cattle trucks for forty-eight hours without food or drink or medical attention ; how they offered soup and coffee to starving men and then spat in it ; these are examples worth calling to our minds.

German nurses, wearing the Red Cross, have offered soup to wounded and starving prisoners, and then drawn it away again uttering the filthiest abuse. The same women would tender a glass of water and then pour it slowly out upon the ground. A favourite amusement of the German nurses on hospital trains was to spit upon our wounded officers and men.

As to the conduct of the German soldiers, we will take first the evidence of an American journalist, Mr. E. A. Powell, of the "New York World." Mr. Powell had an interview with General von Boelm. The German General denied the charges of outrages and said his soldiers were incapable of such acts. Mr. Powell said, "Three days ago, General, I was in Aerschot, the whole town is a ghastly, blood-stained, blackened ruin."

The General said, "Shots had been fired," the massacre "was retribution." The journalist asked why women and children had been killed. The General said none had been killed.

"I'm sorry to contradict you, General," said Mr. Powell, "but I have myself seen their mutilated bodies."

The General said that women and children might get hit if they came into street fighting." To which Mr. Powell answered:

"How about the woman whose body I saw with hands and feet cut off? How about the little girl, two years old, shot while in her mother's arms by a Uhlan? How about the old man who was hung from the rafters of his house by the hands and roasted to death by a bonfire built under him?"

That is part of the evidence of a neutral journalist. Here is the evidence of a German soldier, taken from a letter he had written to his "sweetheart," and found on his dead body:—"I am sending you a bracelet made out of a shell. It will be a nice souvenir for you of a German warrior who has been through the whole campaign and killed many French. I have also bayoneted several women. During the fight at Batonville I did for seven women and four young girls in five minutes. During the battle we fought in the streets, and these women fired on us with revolvers. They also fired on Captain Alors. He told me to shoot them—but I bayoneted them—this crowd of sows."

Here is the evidence of some Belgian servants who fled from a house a few miles out of Brussels, which the Germans pillaged. On returning after the Germans had marched away they found an old lady of seventy on the floor with her throat cut, and the governess, hanging from a tree, "stark naked and mutilated."

Amongst the hundreds of revolting crimes sworn to before the official commission is one related by a priest of Triacourt. The Germans entered the house of Mdlle. Procès and murdered her mother, her grandmother and her aunt, who was 81. "During the night which followed, the Germans played the piano near the dead bodies." We are thus able to understand the German scorn of the British insensibility to music.

At Baccarat, after the town had been burnt and pillaged, the German commander, General Fabricius, remarked pleasantly to the Mayor, M. Renaud, "I did not know there were so many rare wines in Baccarat. We have taken more than a hundred thousand bottles." Always the perfect gentleman.

But suppose General French had done that. What a display of fireworks we should have had in our pro-German papers.

Major Corbett-Smith, in his book, "The Marne and After," tells us that when some British officers entered a charming house near Nogent they found that all the rooms had been used by the German soldiers as "latrines." In one room they found the carcase of a pig which had been slaughtered on the carpet. Everything which could be broken lay shattered on the floor—smeared with filth. "The state of the linen, the ladies' garments, and so forth, was indescribable." And, the Major comments: "One isolated case? No. Ask the French Government how many of their chateaux in those departments of France escaped such a fate."

The Major relates of the entrance of our troops into

Rebais. "A corporal and a couple of men got into a shop, and in the back room they found two young girls. They were trying to climb up the blank wall, legs and arms outstretched, as though they were flies. At the entrance of the men they merely glanced over their shoulders and laughed—a laugh which sent a shudder through the veins. When the corporal touched them they turned round, crouched on the ground, and fawned on him like puppies. In a cot close by lay the broken body of a tiny child. The corporal went out and reported to his officer with the tears rolling down his face!"

Leave them nothing but their eyes to weep with. Destroy their *geist*. War is an act of violence which in its application knows *no* bounds.

And, now, suppose Rebais had been in Sussex, or in Kerry: one wonders what the pro-German press would have found by way of excuse for "our German comrades"—unhappily estranged.

When the French recaptured the plundered chateau of Beuzemont the French colonel found in the linen cupboard behind the bed in which had slept the German General commanding the Nth. Reserve Division heaps of muslin curtains and toilet linen "full of revolting filth." Nietzsche's "Blonde Beasts" must have been akin to Dean Swift's Yahoos.

One other little horror, just one more. Evidence of the special correspondent of the *Times*, March, 1917. "When the Germans left Noyon, on Sunday, they took with them fifty young French girls, who, they said, were to act as officers' servants."

A French officer states that "when he was on a part of the Seine front, now taken over by the British, he saw with his own eyes photographs taken from German prisoners of German officers sitting at dinner and being waited on at table by naked women."

Fifty young French girls as officers' servants! And the Kaiser says it is impossible for an Englishman to understand German culture. Let us, however, try to understand, for it would appear to concern us nearly.

These are not isolated cases. I have books full of crimes as bad, and very many worse. But if the General Staff of the German army are responsible, may we not hold the German people guiltless?

No. The German army *is* the German people. But let us consider. Mr. A. D. McLaren (Australian) says in his book, "Germany from Within" (Constable), 7s. 6d.: "I was in Ruhleben camp at the time of the sinking of the 'Lusitania.' The newspaper indicated with perfect clearness the satisfaction which the 'heroic deed' caused in every city and village in Germany, in every section of the people."

The *Kolnische Volkzeitung* said:

"The sinking of the 'Lusitania' is a success for our submarines, which *must be placed besides the greatest achievements in this naval war*. The sinking of the great British steamer is a success the *moral significance* of which is still greater than the material success. With joyful pride we contemplate this latest deed of our Navy, and *it will not be the last*."

Pastor Phillips of Berlin told his flock that the "divine

mission of Germany" is "to crucify humanity." "German soldiers must strike without mercy." "Let it then be a war without pity. The friends and allies of Satan must be destroyed."

Mr. Gerard, formerly American Ambassador to Germany, who was in Berlin at the time, says that the Navy League (a million members) fully approved of the ruthless submarine warfare.

Prof. Morgan, who served on one of the Atrocity Commissions, says: "It is the fondest of delusions to imagine that all this blood-guiltiness is confined to the German Government. The whole people is stained with it. The innumerable diaries of soldiers in the ranks which I have read betray a common sentiment of hate, rapine and ferocious cruelty." The Professor also mentions the case of the German soldier who, because a French woman did not give him enough coffee "dipped her baby's head into the boiling water."

Mr. A. D. McLaren, who has spent thirty years studying Germany, and was twelve years in the country, says: "I go so far as to express the opinion that few who really knew Germany and the German spirit have been greatly surprised at the treatment accorded to Belgians or the methods of warfare practised by Germany's submarines, or even at the encouragement of the Turks in their sanguinary persecution of the Armenians."

He tells us too: "Since the war no Socialist except Karl Liebknecht ever raised a finger to protest against the Belgian outrages, or the sinking without warning of unarmed ships."

A glance at the German official records of German crime will help us to understand the atrocities of the German soldiers and the brutality and cruelty of German civilian women and men.

In 1909 there were in Germany over eight thousand *convictions* for indecent assaults on children under 14 years of age. In 1908 there were in Great Britain 216 cases of assault on women and girls, and in Germany 9,381 cases of rape. "Of malicious and felonious wounding" there were in Great Britain 1,262 cases and in Germany 729,153 cases.

At the meeting of the General Synod in Berlin, in 1916, the delegate from Bonn said that in Rhenish Prussia the moral tone of the youth of both sexes had "sunk almost to the lowest pitch." If the moral tone of the German youth had sunk since 1912 it must have been low indeed, for in that year boys between the ages of 12 and 18 committed 952 rapes and 8,987 "bodily injuries."

In the first year of the war *The Evening Standard* gave some translations of songs taught to and sung by the children in the German State schools. Here is one verse:

There in their filthy trench the foemen lurk—
Grip them and pull them out and get to work!
In vain the dirty dogs for pardon pray;
A stab or shot is all they'll get to-day.
When in their blood they welter one and all,
"More blood, more blood!" To God our voices call.

Evidently the children (and the teachers) in our elementary schools have much to learn. The German watchword is always "thorough."

Here is a little episode which, as it is related by a

German war correspondent, should carry weight with our pro-Germans. After the capture of Maubeuge, Heinrich Binder, the correspondent, says there were a few English boys of 18 to 20 amongst the prisoners, and, he goes on, "When marching out these English youths were so stupid as to offer the hand to their German victors in token of the gentlemanlike manner in which they accepted defeat. Our men returned a few cuffs for this warlike behaviour, whereupon the English—richer in experience—drew back astonished at German unfriendliness."

This account is true except in one small detail. The German soldiers of Kulture did not cuff the English boys: they spat in their faces. Now, the behaviour of the German and British soldiers at that meeting tells more about British and German character than one could write in a chapter. It reminds one of the Prussian Naval officer prisoner, who, after one of our officers had saved his life, said to his captor: "Well, old man. It will always be the same. You will always be fools, and we shall never be gentlemen."

To finish pleasantly, here is a handful of verbal white flowers, tossed to us by a German lady: "Talk about your so-called atrocities: supposing it were all true, it would be nothing in comparison with what our men would do in England. And we women want to be there too, and we will show them what German women, once they are thoroughly aroused, are capable of doing."

Just a few sweet verbal flowers from a delicate hand. Fragrant flowers; pretty flowers. "Pansies: that's for thoughts."

Do not let us imagine a vain thing. The Kaiser, Bismarck, Clausewitz and the General Staff are Germans ; but they are not the only Germans. Behind them are 65 million " Huns," all united in one purpose, all of one mind. There is no peace party in Germany. As it is with the religion of Brute force, so it is with the diplomacy, and the peaceful penetration and the cult of frightfulness.

Frightfulness is as truly a part of the German war plan as are the poison gas and the flame thrower ; is as truly a part of the German Kultur as are the dogmas that might be right, and that the only law-maker is the sword.

Frightfulness, and the flame thrower, and the dogma that war is a part of policy belong to each other as the flute and the harp and the cornet and the drum belong to a band. They are of each other, as are the words and the air and the accompaniment of a song.

All the brutality, all the chicanery, all the cruelty, all the savage lust and boorish rudeness are parts of " The Thing " ; and the thing is Germany.

There is no German peace party. There is no horror of atrocities amongst the Germans. But there is in Germany a bitter black rage and disappointment that the Germans have not been able to excel every deed of frightfulness by a frenzied orgie of carnage and incendiarism and abominable outrage upon the British people.

CHAPTER XI

WHO CAUSED THE WAR?

IT would seem from some fantastic proposals of the Labour Party that many of our people are still in doubt as to which country caused the war, while there are others who say there must be faults on both sides.

It was made quite clear in the official Blue, Grey, and Yellow Books issued by the Allied Governments that Serbia, Britain, France and Russia did their best to avoid war and that Sir Edward Grey tried his utmost to get Germany and Austria to meet the Entente Powers and come to some agreement which would preserve the peace.

But these books only dealt with the quarrel between Austria and Serbia over the murder of the Archduke Charles, which was not the cause of the war, but only the pretext for war.

We will pass by those books, which can easily be got, and seek the causes of the war in a wider field. If we handle this question as plain men do handle questions that crop up in their own business and their own lives; if we deal with the evidence as ordinary men on a jury would deal with the evidence in a trial we shall be able to reach a just verdict.

Let us begin with our own country, and let us look for

a motive for the war, and at the public feeling and opinions of the British and the Germans before the war.

Of two nations which would be most *likely* to make war, a nation which believed in war, or a nation which believed in peace? Germany believed in war: she is a warlike nation. Britain did not believe in war: she is a peaceful nation.

Is there any doubt about that claim? We have only to compare the acts and speeches of our statesmen with those of Germany, and the tone of the British Press with that of the German Press to be convinced.

Mr. L. J. Maxse, of "The National Review," who read the European danger with wonderful accuracy for more than ten years before the war; who warned our country again and again, and never got thanks for his services, or apology for the scurvy treatment meted out to him, has, during the war, published each year a small book called "The Potsdam Diary." In these diaries Mr. Maxse has taken quotations from British and German speeches, books and newspaper articles, and has so arranged them as to bring into vivid contrast the staring evidence of the danger and the obtuseness and blindness of our public men. These little books are very valuable, as they afford the strongest evidence of the claim I have just made: that before the war the German statesmen, the Kaiser, the German Press and German public men were warlike in their belief and in their language, and were unfriendly in deed and word to Britain, to Russia, and to France.

Of two nations, which would be most *likely* to make

war : a nation which wanted colonies and wanted European territories, or a nation which did not want them ? Germany, on her own showing, wanted, *and meant to fight for*, the domination of the world. She wanted the Balkan States, that she might reach Persia. She wanted Turkey, that she might reach Egypt and the Suez Canal. She wanted the canal and Persia that she might reach India and China. She wanted India and China and the French and Belgian channel ports that she might smash the British Empire, cripple France and isolate Russia. She wanted all these things that she might seize Holland and Belgium and the Dutch, Belgian, Portuguese, British and French colonies. And after that she wanted to conquer America. She thought she had good chances of success, and she had a very strong motive for making war : the conquest and plunder of the world.

What did Britain want ? Britain wanted peace. There was no war party in Britain. We had a peace party who believed in conciliation and in the friendship of Germany ; and we had a peace party who believed in making preparations to defend our country and Empire against attack. But the strongest British advocate of military and naval preparation never had a thought or spoke a word in favour of attacking any other Power or of taking anything that any other Power held. This is not a matter for argument : it is a matter of fact. Britain had the strongest motives for keeping the peace. She had no motive of any kind for making war.

A crime has been committed. Britain had no motive for the crime ; Germany had a very strong motive for the

crime: which nation is most *likely* to have committed the crime?

A crime has been committed. Britain had never uttered a threat, had always shown an excessive desire to be friendly, was a nation fanatically pacifist. Germany had threatened and hustled and insulted Britain and France and Russia over and over again, and had refused with rudeness and contempt all suggestions of disarmament or agreement. Which nation is most *likely* to have committed the crime?

A crime has been committed. Britain was not ready for war, was not armed or organised for war. Germany was armed to the teeth and organised like a machine. Which nation was most *likely* to have committed the crime?

Apart from any other evidence let us consider this. Fritz and John hold neighbouring farms. John is always polite to Fritz and always goes quietly about his own work, and is known to his neighbours as a peaceful man. Fritz is a fighting man and a bully. He hates John, and says so. He has been heard a hundred times to shout at John and accuse him of being old and feeble. He has been seen to shake his fist at John. He is known to be continually training and preparing for a fight. He has said over and over again that he ought to have John's farm, because he is a better farmer than John. He has shouted again and again that John never was the fighter he was thought to be, and that he was a coward and a fool.

Then one day we find Fritz and John fighting. Which should we *expect* to hear had started the fight?

Let us now look into some of the charges made against Britain. Mr. Carl W. Ackerman (an American), in his book, "Germany the Next Republic," seems to suggest that Britain and her Allies were partly to blame. He asks: "If all the belligerents really wanted to avoid war, why did they not begin twenty years before to prevent it, instead of to prepare for it?" And he says that Lord Haldane's mission to Berlin in 1912 "was the only real attempt made by the two leading belligerents to come to an understanding to avoid inevitable bloodshed."

Now, that statement could only be made by a man who knew nothing about the relations of Germany to the Allied countries during the past 50 years.

Every British citizen who has read the newspapers knows that effort after effort has been made by Britain and by Russia at Hague Conferences, and in arbitration treaties, and in diplomatic intercourse to establish friendly relations with Germany. Lord Salisbury, Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman, Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Winston Churchill and Lord Haldane all did their best, and they all failed because Germany invariably takes patience and concession for cowardice, and because Germany did not want peace, but wanted territory and conquest and lordship, and believed that she could get what she wanted by the sword, and by no other means.

Lord Haldane's mission failed because in return for his friendly advances Germany demanded a promise that we should tie ourselves to neutrality while she conquered and plundered France.

And now let us offer to Mr. Ackerman, and all those who

think the Allies made no effort to prevent war, some plain evidence to the contrary.

One of the oft-repeated charges against Britain is the German charge that King Edward VII "ringed her in with hostile alliances." What are the facts?

Germany and Austria made their alliance in 1879. Italy joined in 1882. From 1882 till 1914 the Triple Alliance was in being.

The alliance between Russia and France was made in 1896; fourteen years after the Triple Alliance, and seventeen years after the Austrian and German Alliance.

In 1904, eight years after the Franco-Russian Alliance, came the Anglo-French Entente. That was twenty-five years after the Austro-German Alliance.

In 1907 the Anglo-Russian Entente was signed. Thus the alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy was made twenty-five years before the entente of Russia, France, and Britain.

Britain and her allies, Russia and France, had been faced by the Triple Alliance for a quarter of a century before they began to "ring in Germany" with their alliances.

But as far back as 1870, Germany attacked France. And from 1873 to 1914 Bismarck or his successors, and the Kaiser and the German people displayed implacable enmity to Britain and France.

Any person who believes that Germany was driven into war by the Anglo-French and Russian Alliances must have taken very little notice of German diplomacy and German public opinion.

As I have shown, Germany had long ago declared for war. Her belief that might is right and that war is the only court of appeal makes any protest of her peaceful desires ridiculous.

Now let us look at some more facts.

In 1864, when Austria and Prussia attacked Denmark Britain remained neutral. This was due to Queen Victoria, who over-ruled Lord Palmerston, although that sharp-sighted statesman pointed out that Prussia wanted Kiel as a naval base. Thus we gave Germany her Kiel Canal.

In 1899 we gave Germany Heligoland: her most valuable fortress.

Immediately afterwards the Kaiser tried to make a secret alliance with Russia and France against us. Our Government knew of this ten years before this war, but remained friendly to Germany.

From 1899 to 1914 the Kaiser and the German Press and German public men carried on a studied campaign of violent abuse and threats against Britain.

The British Government and people remained calm and friendly.

In 1900 Germany passed a Navy Bill voting immense sums for naval purposes. The preamble of this Bill was a threat to Britain.

Our Government and people remained calm and friendly, and the few naval men and soldiers who hinted of the coming danger were laughed at by the public and snubbed by Ministers.

In 1904 came the Dogger Bank affair. The British

Fleet was mobilised; but the cloud passed. Germany was not ready. The British people never turned a hair.

In the same year the Kaiser tried to trick Russia into a Russo-German alliance against Britain.

In 1910 Russia and France having consented to the building of the Bagdad Railway, Britain followed suit.

As we have seen, it was for this railway that Germany attacked Serbia, and risked the war. But Britain never thought of making war, although the Bagdad Railway was a machine gun pointed at her head.

In 1911 Germany built strategic (military) railways up to the Belgian frontier. Our Government remained friendly.

In the same year Bernhardi and Tannenberg issued books telling the world that Germany intended to attack France and Britain and make a bid for "World Power or Downfall." Nobody in Britain took the slightest notice.

In 1912 Germany ordered Holland to fortify the Dutch Port of Flushing. Against whom? Against Britain.

Our Government remained calm and friendly and our people never noticed the hostile and threatening act. This was the year of the Haldane mission.

Lord Haldane was rudely snubbed. But our people never heard a word about it, and our Government, who were now alive to the danger, told the country that "we had never been on better terms with Germany."

In the face of all those signs of hostility and of coming war; in the face of all those threats and insults and gross provocations, our Government and our people never showed a sign of anger; never uttered a thought of war.

Finally we all *know* that not one soul in Britain wanted war, that only a very few believed that war was likely, and that those who tried to give warning were looked upon as fools.

Well, oddly enough, there is another complaint made against Britain: that she did not declare her intention of fighting if Germany attacked France. Had Britain said plainly that she would stand by France, we are told, Germany would not have gone to war.

But, in 1911, when Germany almost went to war over the Agadir affair, Mr. Lloyd George, a leading pacifist, told the world in the plainest possible words that Britain would stand by her Allies.

And I ask what could any sensible person gather from the fact that our navy had been concentrated in the North Sea, leaving the Mediterranean largely in the care of France? What could one gather from such an arrangement except a tacit understanding between the French and the British that if one should be attacked the other would come to her aid. I am sure the arrangement was so understood in France, and if it was not so understood in Germany it was because Germany was too intent upon her own plans to read the signs aright.

Of course in Britain the new naval arrangement did not attract much attention, because our people did not want to see the danger of war and would not look at it.

And what about the French? We are told that the French wanted to get back Alsace and Lorraine, and there are certain sour persons in this country who seem to find the French desire to get back those provinces more blame-

worthy than Germany's desire to outrage Belgium and seize the Channel ports.

It is very natural and right for the French to want their own restored to them. But let us bear in mind that France had wanted Alsace and Lorraine for over forty years, but had never gone to war for them, and had never tried to draw Russia or Britain into war for them. Nor did France think of going to war for them in 1914.

And it is true that twice before the fatal year Germany had tried to provoke or to humiliate France.

In 1905, when the Kaiser interfered in Morocco and M. Delcasse asked the French Government to stand firm, the Kaiser demanded M. Delcasse's resignation, and he resigned. France did not want war.

In 1911, when the *Panther* was sent to Agadir, the Kaiser made a second attempt to humiliate France, or to drive her into war, but that time Britain stood by France. Even then France surrendered to Germany 250,000 metres of land in the French Congo. Does that look as if France wanted war; or Britain?

And between 1911 and 1914 what did France do, or what did her Press or people say to show that France wanted war, or to provoke Austria or Germany to make war?

France is as innocent of this war as Britain.

What of Russia? As we have seen, Germany took advantage of the Japanese war to cheat and bully Russia. But Russia did not want war.

In 1908, when Austria seized Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia protested, for those states had 75 per cent. of

Slavs and only 25 per cent. of Teutons; but when Germany came forward and threatened war Russia gave way. Russia did not want war.

No. The British, the French and the Russians hated war, dreaded war and did not expect war. The very closest scrutiny of all their words and deeds proves only that they were patient, quiet and unsuspecting to a degree which is simply astounding when we consider the insolence, the arrogance and the deliberate aggression of the Kaiser and his people.

No American should fail to understand the real feeling and the real actions of Britain and her Allies. The hatred of militarism, the love of peace, the belief in a better civilisation, the hope of a coming brotherhood of nations, the desire to be let alone and to let other nations alone, the enjoyment of comfort and liberty and good business which prevailed in America prevailed in Great Britain.

No Englishman has a better right than I to say these things, for I made several desperate attempts to arouse our people to the danger, and I remember what they thought of me and what they said to me, and how utterly I failed.

Finally I claim that the entry of America into the war is a very strong proof of the justice of the Allied cause. No one can pretend that America caused the war, or wanted war. No one can assert that America looks to make anything out of the war, or has any selfish end in view.

And our hands are as clean as America's. We wanted only one thing—Peace. And after all our labour, and loss, and sacrifice we want only one thing: safety. And

it is because a large number of our people do not seem to want even that, that I am making this humble effort once more to warn them of the tremendous power and the absolutely evil desires of Germany and her Allies.

THE CASE AGAINST GERMANY.

Let us imagine Germany on her trial for burglary and murder.

We will begin with the character and "previous convictions" of the accused.

In 1864 Germany and her accomplice, Austria, broke into Denmark, committed murder and arson and stole the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein.

In 1866 Germany fell upon her accomplice, bludgeoned and robbed her.

In 1870 Germany broke into France, committed murder and arson, and stole the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and 200 millions of pounds in cash.

In 1899 and 1904 Germany tried to persuade France and Russia to join her in a murderous assault on Britain.

What of her character? Germany has been long known to the European police as a backbiter, a slanderer, a fomenter of quarrels amongst her neighbours, a spy, a braggart and a bully. She habitually carried arms. Her home was an arsenal and a magazine. She was continually rattling the sabre, flaunting it in "shining armour," and "banging down her mailed fist insolently upon the diplomatic table."

What was her religion? That of a bandit. As we

have seen she believed that the only right was might. That she was stronger and fiercer and better armed than her neighbours. That it was her destiny to trample upon and rob all the nations in turn, and finally to enslave the world. That small nations had no right to exist. That the weak were made to serve the strong. That war was the only real argument, and that it was her duty to make war when she thought she could win, and that the proper way to make war was to surprise a neighbour and assault her "with the utmost violence" and afterwards to torture and to rob her with ruthlessness and insult.

That is the character of Germany as proved by her own words and by her own deeds. The evidence against her character alone would fill six larger books than this.

What has been Germany's conduct in this war? It has been marked by a ferocity, a cruelty, a blood lust, a hatred and a bestiality of which no other nation on the earth would have been capable. This cannot be denied. The facts are known to all the world.

What was the motive for the crime? The motive has been shown. It is confessed in her own words and proved by her own deeds. The motive was to crush Serbia, to cripple France, to terrorise Russia and to seize middle Europe and the road to the Persian Gulf so that she might conquer the British Empire and invade America. This motive has been laid bare in German books dating from 1895 to 1915.

In 1895 a pamphlet published by the most powerful Pan-German society gave the plan for the German conquest of the world.

In 1898 Rear Admiral von Goetzen, a close friend of the Kaiser, met Admiral Dewey at Manila, and said to him: "You will not believe me, but in about fifteen years my country will begin to war. At the end of two months we shall hold Paris; but that will only form one step towards our real goal—the overthrow of England. Every event will happen exactly at its proper time, for we shall be ready and our enemies will not." That statement was sent by Admiral Dewey to the U.S. Government, who kept it until America came into the War.

Everything that Rear Admiral von Goetzen said fits in with the conduct of Germany for years before this war.

In 1911 Germany built railways up to the Belgian frontier.

In 1912 Germany made the Dutch fortify Flushing.

In 1912 Germany raised a war levy of 50 million pounds.

In 1912 Germany increased her standing army by 544,000 men.

In 1913 the Kaiser told the King of the Belgians that war with France was "inevitable, and close at hand."

On the 6th of November, 1913, Baron von Beyens says, von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, said that war with France was sure to come soon "and insisted emphatically on the certain prospect of success in view of the enthusiasm with which the whole German nation would gird up its loins to beat back the traditional foe."

In May, 1913, von Moltke said "We must throw overboard all the stock commonplaces about the responsibility of the aggressor. As soon as there is a ten to one chance in favour of war, we must forestall our opponent, commence

hostilities without more ado, and mercilessly crush all resistance."

In July, 1914, the Germans finished the widening of the Kiel Canal.

In August, 1914, Germany declared war.

Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador at Berlin, says : " Illuminating figures may be seen in the gold purchase of the German Imperial Bank: in 1911, 174,000,000 marks (shillings); in 1912, 173,000,000 marks; in 1913, 317,000,000 marks.

In 1911, there were published two very important German books: " Germany and the Next War," by General von Bernhardi, from which I have quoted, and the book by Tannenberg, which lays bare the whole German plot for world conquest.

Shortly before the outbreak of war, says Baron von Beyens, the Belgian Minister at the court of Berlin: " Herr Ballin, the Kaiser's confidential servant, came to London with orders from his master to make all arrangements for war and to hoodwink his English friends into the belief that Germany's intentions were peaceful, when in point of fact all was ready for hurling the thunderbolt."

Maxmilien Harden, in his review *Zukunft*, in November, 1914, wrote: " This war has not been forced on us by surprise; we have desired it and it was our bounden duty thus to desire it. Germany wages war because of her immutable conviction that greater world expansion and freer outlets are due to her by right of her own works."

In August, 1914, the same writer said: " Why not admit

what is and must be the truth, that between Vienna and Berlin everything was jointly prepared?"

In August, 1914, the *Lokalanzeiger* declared that Germany's object was "to take her stand as the mightiest nation, which would at last be in a position to give to the world such peace and prosperity as it chooses that they should enjoy."

Now, remembering Germany's gospel of force and frightfulness, her plea that necessity knows no law, her carefully organised war and peace machines, her enormous and costly system of espionage and intrigue, her immense armaments, her avowed intention to conquer the world, her record of treacherous diplomacy, her hatred of Russia and Britain and France, her steady persistence on the Bagdad Railway, her secret alliances with Turkey and Bulgaria, her building of her Fleet, her expansion of her own and the Austrian army, her expenditure on Zeppelins and poison gas and flame throwers, her secret siege artillery, her pushing of strategic railways up to the Belgian border, her fortification of Flushing, and her purchases of gold; and remembering her three sudden attacks on Denmark, and Austria, and France; and remembering her contempt for "scraps of paper," and her contempt for the law of nations; and remembering her savagery and lawlessness on land and sea; and remembering the Kaiser's speeches and the thousands of books and articles abusing Britain and France; and remembering all that Germany hungered for and hoped to gain; and remembering that Russia, and France, and Britain coveted nothing, had threatened nobody, and were unready and unwilling for war, what

conclusion can we come to as to which nation is to blame for the agony and ruin which have come upon Europe since the end of July, 1914?

Who caused the war? Who caused the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870? Who threatened war, who preached war, who stood to gain by war, who had been forty years preparing for war? Germany.

CHAPTER XII

NO INDEMNITIES AND NO ANNEXATIONS

A GREAT many of our working people, and their leaders seem to have snatched eagerly at the Russian Bolshevik cry of "No indemnities and no annexations." This is not surprising, for our people feel more readily than they think, and have a dangerous weakness for compromise and generosity, and an amiable but incautious readiness to forgive and forget. But there is an old saying, that we should "be just before we are generous," and though it is always noble to forgive, it is seldom wise to forget. But let us examine these Bolshevik ideas.

When our Benevolents speak of "no annexations" they speak only for the Allies. They cannot speak for the Germans, for the Germans will not heed them.

Germany made war for the sake of annexation. She has devoted all her strength and patience of hand and brain for half a century to making herself ready and able to annex some of her neighbour's territory. She will fight for that object to the last cartridge, and she will annex every rood of land she can seize and hold.

The Benevolents' counsels of perfection, then, apply only to us and our Allies; and so far as we are concerned

the admonition is wasted: no one in the British Empire wishes to annex any territory as a spoil of war.

But when we come to deal with lands or provinces which Germany holds outside her own borders, lands conquered or annexed by the enemy, we do not find it such plain sailing.

What, exactly, are we to understand by the words "no annexations"?

Do we mean that France is not to have back Alsace and Lorraine? Why not? They are her's.

What of Poland, forcibly annexed and cruelly dragooned by Germany and Russia?

What of Bosnia and Herzegovina, feloniously annexed by Austria? Are not these to be restored to independence? If not, the outcry against annexation is nothing but illogical cant.

Next we have to consider the German colonies and naval bases. What right has Germany to Kiel? She stole it.

Is it likely that China and Japan will give back Kiao Chau to Germany? Germany has no claim, in law or morality to Kiao Chau. Even her own religion of the sword is against her, for she believes that what the sword has won belongs to the sword. The Japanese fought for Kiao Chau, and won it. What is more to the purpose, they have it.

Are we to hand back to Germany the islands in the Pacific? Australia and New Zealand will not think so.

Germany annexed those islands. They have been taken from her by the sword. We do not want them; but this is a question not of sentiment, but of *safety*.

We cannot trust Germany. We should be foolish to leave to her naval ports or submarine bases on the trade routes to our colonies.

If a highwayman steals a horse and attacks us, are we when we have overcome the highwayman to give him back his horse?

As to the African colonies the same objection holds. We do not want the colonies, but it would not be *safe* to give them back to Germany, and General Smuts has told us why.

African natives, says General Smuts, trained and officered by Europeans, make formidable soldiers. If we give back to Germany her African colonies she will build up a great native army, and our African colonies will be bound in self defence to do the same.

It would be madness to let Germany arm and train millions of warlike Africans against us. Let the German colonies be governed how they may, they must not be given back to Germany. This matter must be settled on grounds of safety, not sentiment.

It must be settled, also, not by a few British "democrats" in this country, but by the people of the South African Union and by the natives of the colonies concerned.

Germany believes in the "arbitrament of war," and she has lost her colonies in war. Why return them to her?

Our Benevolents are terribly anxious that we British should gain nothing by this war. But there is one thing for which we have fought, and are still fighting, and that is *Safety*. If we do not win *Safety* by the war we have

wasted our blood and treasure, and may well ask ourselves for what we squandered them.

Nor must we fall into the error of regarding this as a British war. We have our Allies to consider, and our Benevolents have no authority to lay down the law for them.

There is France, who has made such sacrifices, who so long bore the brunt of the attack. France must be compensated and—safeguarded. I shall, I think, speak for all the best of our nation if I say again of France what I said in 1909: "The downfall of France would be a calamity for the world. France is and long has been the leader in literature and art, as in many of the graces and charms of modern life. It would be an evil day for the world which saw France Germanised or weakened. We owe France much, we respect and love her much: our hope is that she may remain France: France happy, and gay, and free, and proud: France great in art, in arms, in science, and in letters."

It is not for a section of one class of the British people to dictate terms of peace to the Allies. France and Belgium and Serbia, who have suffered most and need most, should also speak—and speak first.

And it is a great part of our duty as Allies to ensure to France and to Belgium and Serbia the blessing for which we all have fought—Safety.

The plea for "no indemnities" seems even madder than the plea for no annexation. Again it applies not to the Germans, but to the Allies.

Why no indemnities? In 1871 the Germans robbed

France of two hundred million pounds. Would it be rude and inhuman for France to demand repayment?

We and our Allies have been forced into war by a long-prepared attack intended to crush and to plunder us. The war has cost us thousands of millions. We shall have immense numbers of wounded men and of widows and orphans to provide for. Is there any reason within the pale of the moralities why the robbers and the cut-throats who caused the war should not be made to pay the damages?

Old Selden, a very clever and acute thinker, said: "He that will keep a monkey, he must pay for the glasses it breaks." Is there any reason why he that keeps a devil should not pay for the injuries it inflicts?

But, again, we are not to make profit by means of an indemnity. What kind of an indemnity would Germany have to pay that should cover all the Allies' losses and leave a balance on the credit side? Really, these Benevolents "talk an infinite deal of nothing."

When the war is over, some of our working-class Benevolents tell us, there is to be in Britain conscription of wealth. All the rich are to give up their riches for the national good. Only our own rich. Marry, we would not be so mean as to take a bawbee from the rich among our enemies.

I am a Socialist, but I could never understand why many of our British Socialists who are so implacable towards the British capitalist are so indulgent towards the capitalists of other nations.

Trade and commerce in Germany are in the hands of

the German capitalist. But we must not hinder German trade. We must not tax German goods. We must not think of anything so horrible as a boycott of the capitalist—on the other side of the water.

Now I may be insular and prejudiced and patriotic and otherwise disreputable, but I say frankly that before I thought of tapping the pockets of the British capitalist I should turn my attention to the capitalists who have been paying for Zeppelins and submarines and poison gas and mines.

This has nothing to do with hatred or revenge. In any steps we take against German trade, or German colonies, or German finance, we must not be moved by sentiment, amiable or hostile; but solely by considerations of *safety*.

We are not to harbour any feelings of resentment against Germany. We are to welcome "our German friends" back with open arms to our shores, directly they have stopped drowning our sailors and dropping bombs on our wives and children. I hope not. I don't feel equal to it.

What! My German tailor breaks into my neighbour's house, wounds my neighbour, plunders his safe, murders his wife, and sets fire to the place. He then shoots my child, breaks my head, and throws a bomb on to my roof. And when, after a deadly struggle, we have got him down and disarmed him, I am to send my neighbour to the infirmary, put out the fire, lay out my friend's wife and my own child, wash my hands and face, and—ask the

German tailor to measure me for a suit of mourning clothes.

I could not do it, really. I should be too much excited. The sight of the homicidal tailor would raise such painful associations that I'm afraid I should have to employ an Englishman. I'm an inferior sort of Socialist after all. There must be a leak in my ethical basis.

CHAPTER XIII

THAT BLESSED WORD: FREE TRADE

SOME of our British Bolsheviks went so far as to suggest that we should share all the natural resources of our Empire, *and* the United States, with the Germans.

A very magnanimous and beautiful sentiment; it ought to be set to music. But it *is* sentiment, not sense. And what we have to go for is not melodramatic beneficence, but safety.

If we take in a hungry stray dog, give him a bone, stroke his ears and let him lie by the fire, he will lick our hands and be ready to risk his life in defence of the family. But if we take in a hungry wolf and give him a bone, he will bite our fingers, steal our supper, and directly our back is turned will devour the baby. Germany is a wolf. Our job is not to pet her, but to muzzle her.

Then there is the open-handed, don't-mind-me, let-'em-all-come, good old silly British fantasy of Free Trade. No Protection after the war. Free Trade. (But not free labour.) And no boycott of our German brothers.

But we must try to see facts. And to see facts we must look at facts. If we lose ourselves in angry argu-

ments about Free Trade and Protection we shall be done brown by the Germans, who have only one idea: to get the better of everybody else.

Do not let us worry about Free Trade and Protection, which are only party catch-words. Let us think what it will be *safe* to do.

Whatever we do about German trade we must do with an eye to safety, and to *national* safety. We cannot frame a policy which will ensure the national safety and at the same time fill the pockets of the doll's-eye maker, and the muffin puncher, and the wholesale importer of mouse traps, and the lofty patriot who has large dubbing factories in Germany or Turkey. We must consider the nation and the safety of the nation.

German trade is a huge organised machine, and it is organised to capture our trade and to corner our raw material and to heap up money for another war. Germany is as ruthless in trade as in war. As Mr. Gerard says in his book, "She will stick at nothing to win." Are we to help her to ruin us, or are we to hinder her? Are we to take warning by the fate of Russia, and by the example of what Germany has done to undermine the trade of France and Italy, and to get the better of us in our own Empire? Or are we to play the trusting fool and help her to arm for our destruction?

Obviously if we can defend ourselves we ought to get about it. To say it is impossible is to strike our flag and offer our necks to the heel of the German jack-boot. To say that it will not pay is absurd. Will it pay us to lose our trade? Will it pay to help Germany to make

another war? If we do not, as the result of all our sacrifices and efforts, secure national safety, this war will have paid us very badly.

For a nation of shopkeepers we have some very curious notions of what pays.

Is it possible to boycott or tax Germany? Will it pay to do it? What do the Germans think?

In October, 1917, Herr Ballin, one of Germany's ablest business men, said: "I have no doubt Germany will be just as strong after the war as she was before. *The only trouble would be if the war of arms should be followed by an economic war.*"

During the dispute between Germany and America over the ruthless submarine warfare, *The Basle Nachrichten* said:

"The threatened trade war after the war is such a serious prospect that the maintenance of the last overseas market, America, is sufficiently important to outweigh the advantages of a ruthless pursuance of the submarine campaign."

We know what store the Germans set on their ruthless submarine warfare, yet here is a German opinion that even the submarine "blockade" should give way to the threat of an economic boycott.

In October, 1917, Mr. Rutherford, M.P., said, in an article on German trade after the war:

"A careful examination to-day of the Hamburg and Frankfort newspapers shows that the one thing of which the German financial and commercial community are

horribly afraid after the war is a commercial or economic boycott."

And he adds: "Germany cannot withstand an economic boycott. We know her weak spot: she cannot exist without the resources of the British Empire."

Now one would think that if a British boycott of German trade is looked upon by Germans as so very bad for Germany, then it ought to be very good for us. If Germany so dreads a boycott it is not because it will hurt us, but because it will hurt her.

Not that we want to hurt Germany for the sake of hurting her. If we boycott German trade it will be solely with an eye to our own *safety*. Of one thing we may be quite sure: Germany will use any wealth we let her make out of us to prepare another attack on the British Empire.

A large number of our working men seem to look upon Free Trade as a sacred and moral principle. This is the more curious because Trade Unionism is a form of Protection. The Trade Union free trader calls the non-unionist workman a blackleg. Yet the non-union man is a free trader: he believes in free trade in labour. He is a fool for his pains, but he is a free trader and the unionist workman is not.

There is another queer kink in the British trade unionist: he hates and opposes the British employer or capitalist, but he will not help to defeat the German employer or capitalist.

He will strike against the employment of cheap labour in this country, but he will not stop the products of cheap

labour from coming into Britain and underselling the products of trade union labour.

Take any trade as an example. Take the boot trade. The British trade unions will not allow the employer to pay less than union rates of wages. They would not allow a German to come here and make boots at less than union wages. But when he works for less in Germany, and the boots he makes come here, our trade unionist turns free trader and will not allow the boots to be taxed. "No Protection: Free Trade. No boycott. We only fight British Employers."

But the British trade unionist will say: "We get cheap boots." And that is all right for those who buy boots; but it is not good for those who make or sell them.

There is a flaw in the Free Trade theory. It is this. The Free Trader tells us that free trade is to the benefit of the consumer, and that as we are all consumers free trade is for the benefit of all.

But while it is true that we are all consumers, it is equally true that we are not all producers. And there is the flaw.

What is the consumer? He is one who eats or uses or consumes the product of labour. What is the producer? He is the maker: the worker.

Now, Free Trade, which cheapens the produce of labour, favours the consumer but is to the detriment of the producer.

Take the case of a rich capitalist or landowner. He produces nothing, but he consumes much. He may have hundreds of servants and workmen working on his estate

or in his offices. All those persons want boots. And the higher the price of boots the more of the rich man's money goes into the pockets of those who make or sell boots.

Obviously if boots are dear the boot trade gets more out of the boot user's money than if boots are cheap.

Obviously, again if the rich man and his servants buy German boots the British boot trade gets none of his money at all.

Now, suppose that in course of time Germany captures the leather supply and the British boot trade. Our boot-makers will be out of work. Our boot manufacturers will lose their trade, and when Germany goes to war with us we shall have no bootmakers, no machinery and no leather to make boots for our soldiers or our people.

It is not to the advantage of the workers that the goods they produce or the work they do should be cheap, nor that they should be exposed to the competition of cheap imported foreign goods.

Cheap train fares and tram fares; cheap clothing and cheap furniture may be an advantage to the general public, but they are not an advantage to the railway or tram servant or to the tailor or the cabinet maker.

No policy is to the benefit of the worker which does not first consider the interests of the *producer*.

That does not, of course, mean that protective taxes imposed by landlords or merchants or capitalists or farmers, with axes to grind, are going to do much good to the working man.

My own idea is to protect the things our people make,

and boycott the things the Germans make. And my sole purpose in doing that would be *safety*.

To argue that because workmen in a Protectionist country get better wages than workmen in a Free Trade country, or that conditions are better in a Free Trade country than in a protected country is sheer waste of breath. The conditions may not be the same. The advantage may be due to some cause other than protection. There are bad protection and foolish protection, we know.

But it is quite proper and reasonable to bear in mind that Britain is the only Free Trade country, and therefore is, according to the Free Traders, the only country that is right; and it is quite fair to point out that the almost miraculous growth of German trade and German wealth was accomplished under a stone wall of protective tariffs.

Finally, as I am a non-producer myself, all this is directly against my own interest. If I were only acting for my own advantage I should, as a non-producer, vote with both hands for Free Trade.

But I should not, even then, vote for free trade for German goods. There is nothing dearer for an Englishman than cheap things from Germany.

Germany is our enemy always, but she is a more dangerous enemy in peace than in war.

CHAPTER XIV

CAN WE WIN AND DOES IT MATTER?

THANKS to the noisy advertisement of the German Army's invincibility (a trick the Germans learnt from Frederick the Great), and thanks to the impudent German claims of victory, there are some faint-hearts amongst our people who believe we cannot win the war.

There is another sort of Briton who believes, or pretends to believe, that it does not matter to any but our rich whether we win or lose. "The British wage slaves would be just as well off under German as under British rule," these surly grumblers tell us.

Let us take these unpleasant discouragements in order.

Can we win?

We have seen that the grand triumphal march of the invincible German Army was stopped and thrown back at the Marne, and that on the Western front it has been held; and is still held.

Those who fear we cannot win are most likely thinking of the distance from Ypres to Berlin, and of the failure of Russia.

But an army may be beaten as well on the Belgian border as in Prussia. We have beaten Germany when we have defeated her armies *in the field*.

The collapse of Russia is a great misfortune, and has certainly prolonged the war. Possibly the Russian army may not recover. Possibly Russia may make a separate peace. As that is the worst that can happen, let us count on that. Let us regard Russia as out of the war.

Now let us weigh the chances. There is no doubt that Germany had the best chances in the beginning. She was ready, and she had a definite plan and a central control, and she was able by surprise to carry the war into the enemy's territory and keep it there. Now, the numbers of the Allies and the enemy are roughly as follows:—The Central Powers have a population of about 142 millions. Against these (leaving out Russia) we have to put Great Britain, with her colonies, 65 millions; France, 40 millions; Italy, 36 millions. That, without counting Serbians, or Portuguese, or our own native troops, or the French coloured troops, gives the Allies a total of 141 millions.

Let us say that as fighting men all the Powers' troops are equal, man for man. Let us assume that their losses have been equal. Let us assume that all the nations engaged are war weary and more or less impoverished. We shall still find that the balance is fairly even, although we have not put into the scale the Allied Navies.

At this point in the fourth year of war, when all the combatants have lost much blood and money, and all are more or less war weary, there comes upon the scene the United States of America with untold and untouched wealth, with no war weariness, and with a population of 100 millions.

Why should we believe that we cannot win?

If the French and British can hold the enemy with their own arms, what is going to happen when the Americans come in?

All the danger is past. All the immense advantage of the superior German numbers and armament and the initial surprise is spent. When the war began we had only 80,000 men in the field, and the Germans, better armed than the French, outnumbered them by more than a million men. Yet they were held. They were beaten. They did not break through.

How are we to lose?

Reckoning the Russians out of the war (and that is by no means certain), we have a new ally of overwhelming wealth and numbers, of a great fighting spirit, of invincible energy, ready to fall upon an enemy we have hammered to good purpose for more than three years.

Do not let us fall into the German trap and under-value the fighting power of America. In 1915 I pointed out the folly of the German contempt for America. I said:

"The talk about American military weakness is the boshiest bosh. America is a great nation—big, brave, resourceful, rich; she could, if she chose, raise, equip, arm and train an army of five millions. If the Huns expect a long campaign they will be very foolish to force the Americans into it. No sane nation would wantonly dare the inundation of "the sweeping and unripped waves" of the Great Republic. If Admiral Tirpitz does not want to lose his whiskers, he will keep his piratical cutthroats from the temptation to murder women and children of American birth."

The Americans are greedy fighters on sea or land, and they are not so slow to rouse as the British; they are quicker off the mark. Had the *Lusitania* been an American ship, had the Germans used poisonous gas against American soldiers, had they burnt American prisoners, shelled American watering-places, and crucified American volunteers, the whole American continent would now be in a blaze."

And now the American continent is in a blaze. And apart from the fact that the Americans "mean business," it will be worth our while to think carefully what the American power is.

America has a population almost equal in numbers to Germany and Austria combined; and her people are more alert and resourceful than the enemy.

This immense population comes into the war fresh and keen. America has done no fighting and is not war-weary. She comes into the war with enormous wealth. While the Allies and their enemies have been spending money in thousands of millions, America has been heaping up wealth. She is not war-weary, she is not in debt. And she has 100 million people.

She comes into the war against an enemy who is war-weary and war-worn and on the verge of bankruptcy. She comes when that enemy is held and has been over and over again repulsed and defeated, and she comes when the French and British armies are larger than at the opening of the war and have unlimited artillery and supplies.

The American Army and Navy will have the advantage of all the Allies have learned in strategy and tactics.

America is even more secure than Britain against molestation from the enemy. She has no air raids, or bombardments, or invasion to guard against, but can give all her time, energy and money to the task of training and arming her forces.

When we were raising our armies we were at war. We had our Navy to supply and our trade routes and communications to guard, our coasts to defend, our blockade to keep up, the seas to sweep of mines, the submarines and raiding cruisers to deal with, and our troops and guns and supplies to transport to and fro all over the world. America will have none of these drawbacks. She can train and arm her forces in safety, and is able herself to supply her every want.

How or why the clever Germans came to make such a mistake about America is hard to say; but they did make it. They almost forced America into the war.

And they see now what they have done and they are horribly afraid. And the sign of their knowledge and their fear is afforded by their frantic efforts to trick or wheedle the Allies into a foolish peace.

No; we cannot be beaten. The only danger is that our victory may be thrown away, that class or party dissensions or mistaken ideas about the enemy and the war may drive our Government into a hasty and inconclusive peace.

We can beat the enemy if we "stick it," and the enemy knows it. But he is an artful enemy, and unscrupulous,

and he will cheat us into a false truce if we are weak enough to let him.

If our people understood; if they would not grumble about butter and sugar and haggle for wages; if they knew what the enemy is trying for; how he hates us and burns to trample on us and enslave us; if the people could be got to see that class feuds, and party feuds, and dividends, and rates of pay don't matter, because we are fighting for our lives; in fact, if all the men of Britain were as unselfish, as loyal, and as brave as the soldiers and the women, there would be no need to ask if we can win nor if we are willing to lose.

Let us look next at the assertions of the Don't Cares: that it does not matter to the workers if we are beaten.

It is one of the pet delusions of a certain class of (anti-) British workmen that only the wealthy classes stand to lose by a German victory, that our defeat or surrender would make no difference to our working classes.

The Germans do not share that view. Here is what Dr. Lencsh, a German Socialist, says about it:

"When the English monopoly is broken, the English working classes will lose their privileged position. They will be reduced to the same level as the workmen of other lands."

Here is a hint from a German paper:

"Germany's object and Germany's destiny are to take her place as the mightiest nation, which would be at last in the position to give to the world with that moderation and forbearance which are its own—*such peace and prosperity as it chooses that others should enjoy.*"

How much peace and prosperity would the Germans choose that our working people should enjoy? Here is the Pan-German programme, to give us an idea. This was published more than twenty years ago, and is not the outcome of hate roused during the war.

"No doubt the Germans will not be the only people of the new Empire, but they alone will govern, they alone will exercise political rights. All the same, they will allow strangers under their rule to *carry on minor employment in the State.*"

But we have other things to guide us beside threats: we have facts. We know how the Germans treated the working classes of Belgium, France, Russia, Italy and Serbia.

We know that they made them work like slaves: men, women, and children. We know that they flogged the men, and sometimes the women, and often the children. We know what happened to the young girls.

Is there any reason to hope that they would not be more savage and brutal and revengeful with our people?

In Belgium they took all the machinery out of the factories and sent it to Germany. That is what they would do here.

In the demands of the German merchants, and professors and politicians given in Grumbach's book, one of the commonest demands is that the people of conquered provinces should be deported and their places taken by Germans. I have seen German maps in which all Scotland and England, except Devon and Cornwall, are shown as German.

The people of other countries, including those workers who think they have nothing to fight for, would be deported and used as slaves.

When the German Army entered the Russian port of Riga their first care was to hang above a hundred of the Russian Revolutionary leaders, to whom they owed the capture of the town. (Chorus: "Then raise the Scarlet Standard high.")

When the German soldiers get into Glasgow and Coventry and—"they never will get in." I hope not; I believe not.

But who has kept them out? Not the orators, nor the strikers nor the grouzers.

One would imagine from the airs these Don't Cares give themselves that wars are won by votes and phrases, and not as the Huns believe by "blood and iron."

Here we have mobs of sour visionaries and discontented bonus hunters posing as "The Democracy," and issuing ultimatums to the Allied Powers as to how the world shall be run after the war. But the Germans also have ideas as to what those "Democrats" shall and shall not do after the war—if the Germans win. If the Germans don't win it will not be the fault of the Don't Cares, who are riding for a fall.

Now there were in Italy large numbers of ecstatic visionaries who rode for a fall—and got it. As a result of their noble efforts in the cause of freedom, the Huns are in possession of large and fruitful tracts of Italian soil. And the Huns are forcing the ecstatic Italian civilians to till the soil. They have made them work sixteen hours

a day in the fields—men, women, and children. If they do not work hard the women will be locked up and starved and the men and children will be flogged.

In France and Belgium the women have been flogged—and worse. Young French girls have been handed over to the German officers—as servants.

That is not democracy. No. It is Pan-Germanism. The Germans are not democrats. They do not want democracy, they do not like democracy. They *hate* democracy. It is directly contrary to German kultur.

Votes! But there's the rub. Under German rule our "Democrats" will have no votes. Neither will they have any $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. bonus. Nor will they be allowed to strike. All the striking will be done by their German task-masters, and it will be "frequent and painful and free."

"But the Germans are NOT here. They have NOT won." Exactly. And why? Because the hated British "militarists" have not allowed them to get here, because the Navy and the Army have not let them win. Let us remember, noble "Democrats," that the enemy fleet is within twenty hours' sail of our coasts.

It is not "democratic" speeches and peace manifestos that keep him where he is. Nothing but the guns of our Navy and the bayonets of our Army stand between us and him.

A study of the official reports of the German atrocities will enable our anti-British workmen to judge of what would happen to a lot of them *before* they went into slavery. Let the anti-British workman cease to imagine

a vain thing: the Germans as conquerors are very thorough; they would "leave him nothing but his eyes to weep with." Or to quote an amiable German writer, Maximilien Harden, "Every means will be enthusiastically employed against our enemies by the German people. We will go back to the times of savagery, when man was a wolf to his fellow-man."

No, my dear anti-British working man, we are fighting for our lives: for all our lives, and if at any time the war seems to be going against us or our allies, you pray—hard.

CHAPTER XV

THE COMPLETE "THING"

I HAVE tried in the preceding pages to give a complete view of what President Wilson has called "The Thing" we are fighting against.

When we look at "The Thing" as a whole we cannot fail to realise the deadliness of the peril which confronts us.

We recognise the tremendous power of this army of 142 millions of people, trained to one end, disciplined by the same law, acting unanimously and continuously with the one purpose.

Germany began by adopting the military methods of Clausewitz: to make every imaginable preparation for war. To gain advantage by surprise, and to wage war with a violence that knows no bounds.

She extended this method to her business and diplomacy and has been gradually drilled and educated to "stick at nothing" in her struggle for "World Power or Downfall."

We must not fall into the fatal error of underestimating her power and misreading her purpose. We must remember that she puts her trust in "Blood and iron," and that only by better blood and better iron, and not by soft speeches and mild advances can she be defeated.

The late Lord Salisbury said "The British constitution

is a bad fighting machine," though he is often quoted as saying that Democracy is a bad fighting machine. We need not argue about democracy, as we have only a pretence of the real thing in this country, but we must admit that as a war machine our Empire is very far from perfect.

We are not, as events have proved, a united or unanimous nation. We have not the enemy's oneness of view and singleness of purpose. Instead we have a military view, a naval view, a Conservative and Liberal view, a Pacifist view and a Labour view, and almost as many personal views as we have newspapers and authors.

But in Germany there is only one party: the German Party; only one view, the German view; only one purpose, the German purpose; only one master, the Kaiser.

In Germany the people do as they are told. Perhaps in a crisis the British people would do the same, but they are not told, or rather they are told so many conflicting things.

I said we have only a pretence of democracy. It is true. Democracy means rule by the majority. When in this war has the majority had a chance to speak its mind? When has it been in a position to form an opinion? In order that the British people should be solid for the war two things were necessary: one, that they should know what the war was about; the other, that they should have reasons offered them for what looked like a complete right-about face of the leaders who had preached pacifism and safety and the friendliness of Germany for twenty years.

The great bulk of the British people take very little interest in foreign politics, are strongly opposed to war,

of which they know nothing, and are in the habit of speaking their minds and resenting any kind of dictation or interference in their personal liberties on the part of Governments or officials.

The Government, suddenly hurled into war, were alarmed and bewildered. They did not understand nor trust the people. They tried to muzzle and deceive them. The result has been a steady increase of popular suspicion and discontent and a multiplication of intrigues and cabals.

The work of enlightening, encouraging and uniting the people, of inspiring the people with confidence and enthusiasm has been left to private writers and speakers, who have neither the authority nor the means to do what the Government could and should have done.

An example of the weak and shiftless action of the Government is afforded by the official failure to give the people any guidance through the upheaval caused by the Russian revolution.

In the midst of the public excitement over the Russian cataclysm, with frantic orators repeating the wild sentiments of Bolshevist visionaries; with disaffected shop stewards preaching general strikes, and inflated mediocrities issuing ultimatums to the British and Allied Powers; and with ominous whispers of revolution heard here and there, our Government should have taken the people into their confidence, told them the truth, pointed out the way and appealed to the good sense and loyalty of the country.

A general strike by half or a quarter of a million men with the purpose of stopping the war is not democracy: it

is blackmail. The Government instead of trying to hide the smouldering sedition should have spoken frankly and called upon the army and the people to make such treachery impossible. But the Government trusted to concealment and to argument, and to promises that were bribes to the malcontents and injustices to the sailors and soldiers.

Revolution! Why whisper and hint about revolution. Men who would make a revolution in this country to win a feeble peace are capable of burning down their houses to roast their dinners. What cause have the British people for revolution? Against what or whom are they to revolt? What do they hope to gain, except bloodshed, and terror, and ruin and defeat? But we have so little faith in the good sense and good feeling of our splendid people that we are afraid to speak the word out loud.

Look at "The Thing," we are fighting. Is it not vile, and bloody and bestial and cruel?

It is all that; and it is also formidable and strong. It cannot be pacified, nor persuaded; it must be fought and defeated.

We are war-weary and sick with horror, and we realise that the price of victory is a bitter price. It is, but it must be paid if victory is to be ours. And bitter as is the price of victory it is not as bitter as the price of defeat; and if we fail, if we shrink now, the enemy will exact the price of our defeat to the uttermost farthing.

A cheap or premature peace, anything short of complete victory will mean another war.

The policy of Germany has been continuous since 1862.

The Kaiser's speeches and the diplomacy of Germany since 1888 are a continuation of the policy of Bismarck.

The Pan-Germans or World Power Party follow Clausewitz and Treitschke and Bismarck. Von Freytag, in his newly-published book, "Deductions from the World War," quotes Clausewitz and Treitschke over and over again. The purpose of his book is to show that Germany did not make sufficient preparation for *this* war, and must be better prepared for the *next*.

For more than fifty years Germany has followed the same plan. It has been all Germany for Germanism all the time.

Germany's cult of war, and her cult of trade, and her cult of espionage, and her cult of frightfulness have been only the different forms and colours and lights and shades in the same picture: the picture of the stealthy, insatiate, ruthless German soul.

The picture of "The Thing" we are fighting: of "The Thing" we must conquer or be conquered by.

It is idle to talk about "Prussian Militarism" and "German Democracy" as different things. They are one and the same thing. Germans have indignantly declared that we cannot destroy German militarism without destroying Germany. German militarism *is* Germany. Can one destroy a man's backbone without hurting him?

Since the German rush was arrested at the Marne, *Germany* has been talking and preparing for the *next* war. *We* have been hoping that this war shall be the last!

General von Freytag has expressed the German feeling. Germany, von Freytag says, must limit her war aims at

present: "these must be governed by the encircled situation in which she finds herself"—but afterwards it will be the task of German diplomacy "to prevent the recurrence of such a menacing situation, or at any rate to work with the object of securing to Germany greater freedom for violent and decisive blows in one direction."

There is the German peace plot exposed. Let us get out of this war as best we can, and we shall be able to "prepare for violent and decisive blows" in the next war.

Our watchword in war must be Victory, in peace Safety. We have nothing to do with German revolutions nor with German democrats. We have had some experience of German democrats. If the democracy of Germany is more than a figment of the Russian Bolshevik brain, and if that democracy can overthrow the Kaiser and *will do it*, and sue for peace, then it will be time enough to deal with the German democracy; and it will be wise to trust them as much as we have, one hopes, learned to trust all Germans—and no more.

When we come to consider terms of peace we must remember Serbia, and the Bagdad Railway. If we leave the Germans command of middle Europe, or leave Serbia unprotected, Germany will be able to make her next war with very much greater power.

We must remember that if we leave Germany strong we leave the neutral nations, who live in terror of her frightfulness, in such a position that they will be unable to stand up against her bullying aggression.

With Germany undefeated what security can there be

for Holland, for Belgium, for Switzerland, for Denmark and for Sweden?

And in any peace we make we must not forget that the uncurbed German peace machine is a living and formidable and perpetual peril.

Finally we shall do well to make clear to our New Democracy the principle of democracy, which is the rule of the *Majority*.

Some of our new democrats seem to confuse the "Voice of Labour" with the voice of democracy.

"Organised labour," one of our new democrats has told us, will consist of over three millions of voters. And he goes on to indicate to the world what these three millions will and will not allow.

Now it is not for three millions of British voters to direct the policy of 240 millions of Europeans and Americans. The terms of peace concern France Italy, Belgium, Serbia, Portugal, Japan, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States of America.

Even in our own Empire the three millions of organised labour are a minority. There are many millions of British citizens outside their ranks. There are some four or five millions of sailors and soldiers. There are some five or six millions of women. There are the Government and the Houses of Parliament and all the so-called educated and professional classes.

And the real democracy does not mean that a minority of one nation shall over-rule the populations of five large and a dozen small Powers.

Neither may we believe that the three millions of organized labour are unanimously of the opinion of the somewhat demonstrative leaders who have spoken with such confidence in their name.

Democracy means, not "The voice of Labour," but the voice of the majority of the people.

And there is nothing in the spirit of real democracy to make it improper to take pains that before the whole people of any one country is called upon to give a verdict they shall have at least a fair chance of listening to the evidence.

It is impossible for me to give the whole of the evidence in the compass of a small book. I have put the case to the best of my ability, giving such evidence as I can, but my book is only an outline and a guide; a guide to other books, of which a list appears at the end of this volume.

Without those other books this book of mine is incomplete. My chief purpose in writing is to enable my readers to find fuller evidence and a fuller statement than it is possible for me to give.

CHAPTER XVI

THE TWO IDEALS

AN Englishman loves England as he loves his mother. He does not deceive himself as to his mother's intellect or beauty. He loves her for respect and for gratitude, and because the blood in his body pulses responsive to the blood in the faithful and tender friend who bore him.

Men do not love their mothers and their wives by logic : neither is the steadfastness of friendship founded on illusion.

We honour England because she is great and fair ; but we love her because we are Englishmen.

We love England because she is our motherland ; but we will maintain her greatness and her fairness.

What is this England of our love and homage ? -

She is the England of Shakespeare and of Chaucer, and Defoe and Dickens, and the Spencer Reliques. She is the England of Turner and Gainsborough and Constable, and Caldecott and Cecil Alden, and Arne and Bishop. She is the England of Elizabeth and Drake and Raleigh. She is the England of Uncle Toby and Corporal Trim, of Dogberry and Falstaff and Mr. Pickwick. She is the England of Mount's Bay and the Cotswold Hills, and the

Devonshire lanes, and Spithead. She is the England of the South Downs and the Yorkshire wolds, and the Thames and the Severn and the Surrey hills. She is the England of Sherwood Forest and the Cumberland Lakes, and the Lincoln Fens and the Cinque Ports, and the windy Foreland.

She is the England of Liverpool and Manchester and the Port of London, and East Ham, and Scarborough and the Walworth Road; the England of Newcastle and the Potteries and Leeds and Blackpool, and Stonehenge and Salisbury, and Winchester and York and Rye. She is the England of Canterbury and Nottingham and Norwich and Falmouth and Stratford-upon-Avon. She is the England of Selborne and Horsham and Southampton Water; the England of the Pantiles and the Pump Room and Tower Hill and Piccadilly.

She is the England of Bombay and Hong Kong, and Melbourne and Quebec, and Aden and Suez, and Colombo and Shanghai. She is the England of the Five Continents and the Seven Seas: the England of our childhood and our manhood and our dreams. She is the England of a thousand years of war and industry, of love and literature, and hungry enterprise, and eager quest and high endeavour. She is the England of proud humility and steady courage; the England of tragic blunderings and lucky inspirations, and human longings and disillusion, and tears and blood and merry laughter.

She is the England of Langton and Cromwell, of Marston Moor and the Armada. She is the England of Mons and Ypres, of Wilberforce and Howard. She is the

England of the thorn-brake and the primrose, and the black cap and the oak. She is our England, noisy with the clack of shuttles and the roar of furnaces. She is our England; great in her achievements and temperate in her speech; our own old England, strong in adversity, generous in her friendships, in victory magnanimous and merciful.

Sit you down at your English piano, dear English girl or boy, and play us our old English melodies: as "Chevy Chase," or "The Light o' Love," and we shall hear the beating of sweet England's heart. We shall recognise the plaintive gaiety of English song: the songs of the land of factories and bluebells, of blackberry copses and lichened cottages, of ancient halls and old grey towers; the songs of fogs and roses, of tender strength and virile humour; the songs of knights and fairies; the songs of the sailor men and the explorers, the songs of the builders of ships and roads and bridges, and the makers of laws and drains and "health and quiet breathing"; the songs of sunny playing fields, and dancing children, and gracious women ordering the home; the songs of the cider press and plough, of ivied churches and cosy taverns; the songs of the shy and reticent daughters and sons of the brave land of individual freedom and imperial glory.

If we harken to the lisping renegades who champion our enemies, to love England is a sin. Let them suspect us of loving England and they will beat up their milky brains for faults to fling at the dear old Motherland who is perennially brave and perennially bonny and perennially young. They will pose in the green glades where Robin

drew his bow, or in the shadowed aisles where sleep our English dead, or by the stern beaches of the English sea whereon Drake shattered the cruel might of Spain, and they will baa to us of capitalists and armament rings and secret diplomacy and the solidarity of nations. They will sneer at the ideal which Shakespeare sang and Nelson died for, hissing out their clichés of "Jingoism" and "Flaggism"; and they will fall over each other to grasp the blood-stained fist of a Hunnish robber or to weep tears of sympathy down the back of a head-hunter or a Pathan raider whose slayful humour has been curbed by the brutal militarist caste of tyrannical England.

Come, then, you fluting apologists for the Loathly Beast, and listen to his creed:

"We are the Salt of the Earth and the Chosen People of God, and our mission is to hack our way through to victory and to give to other nations such liberties and possessions as we think it right for them to enjoy."

"There is no Right but Might. Might gives the Right to occupy and conquer. Might is the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things."

"War is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds."

"Conquered peoples have no rights: only to be governed by Force."

"There is no place in the world for small nations. The weak are the natural prey of the strong."

"No quarter must be given, no prisoners taken. Act like the Huns of Attila a thousand years ago."

"Above all, inflict on the inhabitants of invaded towns the maximum of suffering. Leave them nothing but their eyes to weep with."

There is the creed of Germany. And I will now quote, from a book I love, perhaps the most English book in our tongue, some of the things the English pray for :

That it may please Thee to have mercy upon all men.
We beseech Thee to hear us, Good Lord.

From all blindness of heart; from pride, vain-glory and hypocrisy; from envy, hatred and malice, and all uncharitableness,

Good Lord, deliver us.

That it may please Thee to preserve all that travel by land or water, all women labouring of child, all sick persons and young children; and to show Thy pity upon all prisoners and captives,

We beseech Thee to hear us, Good Lord.

From lightning and tempest; from plague, pestilence, and famine; from battle and murder, and from sudden death,

Good Lord, deliver us.

That it may please Thee to succour, help, and comfort, all that are in danger, necessity, and tribulation;

We beseech Thee to hear us, Good Lord.

That it may please Thee to strengthen such as do stand; and to comfort and help the weak-hearted; and

to raise up them that fall; and finally to beat down Satan under our feet;

We beseech Thee to hear us, Good Lord.

In those two ideals there flames out the difference between the British and the German souls.

I have nothing to add, except an expression of my heart-felt gratitude that "my limbs were made in England."



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SOME USEFUL WAR BOOKS

** The best account of the war as a whole is given in "*Germany at Bay*," by MAJOR HALDANE MACFALL. Cassell & Co. 6s.

** The best and fullest description of the German plot in Middle Europe, is "*The Pan-German Plot Unmasked*," by ANDRE CHERADAME. The maps are invaluable. John Murray. 2s. 6d.

As a picture of German thought and feeling before the war, "*Pan-Germanism*," by PROF. ROLAND G. USHER, will be found very instructive. Constable. 1s.

* "*German Annexationist Aims*," by S. GRUMBACH, is essential to those who wish to understand the real war aims of the German nation. John Murray. 3s. 6d.

** "*Germany and the Next War*," by GENERAL VON BERNHARDI, is indispensable. This is one of the most astonishingly brutal and outspoken war books ever written. Arnold. 2s.

Every man and woman in Great Britain should read the following books, which deal with military and civilian spying and with that form of German warfare known as Peaceful Penetration :—

"*The German Spy System in America*," by JOHN PRICE JONES. Hutchinson & Co. 5s.

"*The German Spy System in France*," by PAUL LENOIR. Mills and Boon. 6d.

** "*Peaceful Penetration*," by A. D. McLAREN. Constable. 3s. 6d.

* "*The Bloodless War*," by EZIO M. GRAY. Hodder & Stoughton. 3s. 6d.

"*The German Mole*," by JULES CLAES. G. Bell & Sons. 2s. 6d.

"*Russia and Democracy*," by G. DE WESSELITSKY. Heinemann. 1s. 6d.

Of the numerous books dealing with German Atrocities the following will be found useful :—

"*The German War Book*," by PROF. J. H. MORGAN. John Murray. 2s. 6d.

* "*The Road to Liège*," by GUSTAVE SOMVILLE. Hodder and Stoughton. 3s. 6d.

"*German Atrocities: An Official Investigation*," by PROF. J. H. MORGAN. Fisher Unwin. 2s.

A very full and useful examination of German Frightfulness and its relation to international law is given in "*German Imperialism and International Law*," by JACQUES, MARQUIS DE DAMPIERRE. Constable. 10s. 6d.

Those books marked above with a star are the most important. If further curtailment is necessary I should recommend the four books marked with double stars.



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